

# MIGRATION GOVERNANCE INDICATORS

A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE



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**MIGRATION**

**GOVERNANCE**

**INDICATORS**

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# LIST OF ACRONYMS

<b>BLA</b>	Bilateral labour agreement
<b>CITLAW</b>	Citizenship Law Indicators
<b>DEMIG</b>	Determinants of International Migration
<b>ELECLAW</b>	Electoral Law Indicators
<b>EMIX</b>	Emigrant Policies Index
<b>EIU</b>	The Economist Intelligence Unit
<b>GFMD</b>	Global Forum on Migration and Development
<b>G20</b>	Group of Twenty
<b>GLOBALCIT</b>	Global Citizenship Observatory
<b>HDI</b>	Human Development Index
<b>HLPF</b>	United Nations High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development
<b>ICI</b>	Immigrants' Climate Index
<b>IDP</b>	Internally displaced person
<b>IMPIC</b>	Immigration Policies in Comparison
<b>IMPALA</b>	International Migration Policy and Law Analysis
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>MiGOF</b>	Migration Governance Framework
<b>MGI</b>	Migration Governance Indicators
<b>MIPEX</b>	Migrant Integration Policy Index
<b>MIGPROSP</b>	Prospects for International Migration Governance
<b>MiTSoPro</b>	Migration and Transnational Social Protection in (post-)crisis Europe
<b>MoU</b>	Memorandum of understanding
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organization
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>PICMD</b>	Policy and Institutional Coherence for Migration and Development
<b>RCP</b>	Regional Consultative Process
<b>SDG</b>	Sustainable Development Goal
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UN DESA</b>	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs





# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Based on the Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF) welcomed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Member States in 2015, IOM developed a set of Migration Governance Indicators (MGI) with the Economist Intelligence Unit. The MGI is an indicators-based process, involving both data collection and national consultations, which enables any country to assess its national migration governance framework in relation to a set of reference indicators.

The MGI was developed when countries around the world agreed to work towards the achievement of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 SDG targets, including many important references to migration. The SDGs' central reference to migration is in Target 10.7, which calls upon all countries to facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and the mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.

Defining and measuring migration governance is no easy task given that migration policies vary widely among countries. The MGI was developed to help countries assess the comprehensiveness of their migration governance framework and their efforts to achieve progress on SDG Target 10.7. The MGI can also help countries to take stock of how much progress they are making in relation to other migration-relevant SDG targets, such as reducing remittance transaction costs, recruitment costs and trafficking in human beings.

In recent years, an increasing number of migration experts have developed indices to measure different aspects of migration governance, but these indices have tended to focus on only one region of the world or one area of migration policy. The MGI takes a broader approach, covering 6 policy domains, and including 90 indicators that have been used worldwide. The MGI, however, is not a new ranking index. The MGI approach based on consultation with national authorities seeks to provide a baseline assessment of current migration governance structures and space for a discussion about ways in which different stakeholders can address governance gaps.

This report presents the findings of a first analysis of MGI data collected in 49 countries between 2015 and 2019. The 49 countries cover all United Nations regions of the world and include a wide range of different migration settings. It should be recalled, however, that the MGI focuses on policy inputs, institutions and processes, but not outputs and implementation. Some of the key findings of the report are presented according to the six policy domains of IOM's MiGOF and in relation to key SDG indicators. The MGI data highlight that overall migration governance in terms of cooperation with other countries is well developed across countries. Legal and policy frameworks, institutionalization and processes on migration are less or more unevenly developed in the other five domains.

# KEY FINDINGS FROM 49 MGI COUNTRIES

## Policy domain 1: Migrants' rights



- Nearly half (43%) of the 49 countries provide access to health services regardless of the legal status of immigrants.
- Many countries (39%) have established mechanisms to protect the rights of their citizens working abroad.

## Policy domain 2: “Whole-of-government” approach



- Just over half (55%) of countries defined their national migration strategy in a programmatic document.
- 39 per cent of countries reported that they aligned their migration strategy with national development strategies.

## Policy domain 3: Partnerships



- The vast majority of countries (90%) signed at least one bilateral memorandum of understanding on migration with another country, and over half (53%) have agreements with one or more countries to facilitate the portability of social security entitlements.
- Nearly half (47%) of the countries formally engage members of diaspora communities in agenda-setting and implementation of development policy.

## Policy domain 4: Well-being of migrants



- Two out of five countries (41%) have developed measures that promote the ethical recruitment of immigrants.
- Three out of four countries have formal measures in place to facilitate the immigration of skilled migrants by recognizing their degrees, skills and competencies.

## Policy domain 5: The mobility dimensions of crises



- Over half (55%) of the countries do not report having an explicit strategy with specific measures to provide assistance to immigrants during crisis and post-crisis phases in the country.
- Just over half (51%) of the countries do not have strategies for addressing migratory movements caused by environmental degradation and the adverse effects of climate change.

## Policy domain 6: Safe, orderly and regular migration



- The vast majority (84%) of the countries have one or more fully dedicated bodies tasked with different aspects of integrated border control and security.
- Two countries in the MGI sample do not have a website clearly outlining visa options. Some countries only provide this information in one language, while others do so in up to 12 languages.

## SDG targets

The MGI collects data relevant to the monitoring of several SDG targets. Some relevant examples have been mentioned above. A few additional examples from the 49 countries include the following:

- SDG 17.18 calls for better data disaggregated by migratory status. Nearly two thirds (61%) of the 49 countries include migration questions in their national census. But only 50 per cent of countries publish migration data on a regular basis, and one quarter do not disaggregate migration data by sex.
- Nearly all countries (92%) report having a strategy in place to combat human trafficking (SDG 8.7), and 70 per cent of countries publish data in this regard.

## Way forward

Results from the data collected through the MGI, and the national consultations in 49 countries, suggest three broad conclusions for policymakers. **First, countries often account for comprehensive migration governance frameworks.** Many countries focus on both aspects of migration, immigration and emigration, but to different extents. Second, **migration policies are often not fully aligned with other important relevant policy domains**, such as sustainable development, disaster management and climate change. Third, the MGI has helped countries identify **many areas where migration capacities could be strengthened**, including through developing a coherent overall national migration strategy.

Since 2015, 50 countries have conducted assessments of their national migration policies and governance structures using MGI and found this to be a useful tool to identify existing practices and gaps in migration governance, as well as report to the High-level Political Forum on progress in achieving SDG Target 10.7.2. Several countries have built on the MGI to inform the development of new national migration policies and strategies, while others are using the MGI to help devise their United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDFs).

Looking ahead, IOM plans to develop the MGI further. First, since 2018, IOM has launched a “Local MGI” initiative and a set of indicators to help local authorities take stock of local migration strategies and initiatives. Second, IOM is developing the MGI into a capacity development tool linking the initial national assessment of MGI indicators to follow-up initiatives to develop priorities for migration governance capacity-building.

Finally, this report is based on data collected from 49 countries at one point in time. Looking ahead, the MGI could become a global tool to advance understanding of migration governance, if more countries participate in MGI exercises and if they do so on a regular basis.





# 1. INTRODUCTION

The two UN High-level Dialogues on Migration and Development in 2006 and 2013, and various other dedicated, State-led and informal dialogues – coupled with the urgency generated by the 2015–2016 large influx of migrants to Europe and other concomitant humanitarian crises around the world – created the conditions for recent progress at the global level (Newland, 2019; Solomon and Sheldon, 2019). In particular, in 2015, several comprehensive agreements were adopted by the international community that touch upon human mobility, such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development, the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. In 2016, the New Urban Agenda was adopted at the UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is the global blueprint for international cooperation, and it includes 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 SDG targets. The 2030 Agenda is a landmark agreement that reflects a shared global vision towards sustainable development for all, and it recognizes the importance of migration for sustainable development.

The SDGs' central reference to migration is in Target 10.7 to facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies. This target appears under Goal 10 (to reduce inequality within and among countries). In addition, a number of other SDG targets focus on migration-related issues including human trafficking, remittances and the disaggregation of data by – among other things – migratory status, as discussed in subsection 4.1 (Migration Governance Indicators and the Sustainable Development Goals).



In 2015, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) developed a Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF)<sup>1</sup> to help define what “well-managed migration policy” might look like at the national level. The MiGOF was welcomed by IOM’s Member States the same year.<sup>2</sup> With the Migration Governance Indicators (MGI), IOM – working with the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) – started an initiative to collect data in order to assess national frameworks and operationalize the MiGOF in cooperation with national authorities.

The aim of this report is to shed light on key global trends on migration governance based on data collected in 49 countries in all UN regions, between 2015 and 2019 (see Annex I for the list of countries). For each country, the MGI database includes about 90 indicators that are framed within the 6 domains of the IOM’s MiGOF: (a) migrants’ rights; (b) “whole-of-government” approach; (c) partnerships; (d) well-being of migrants; (e) mobility dimension of crises; and (f) safe, orderly and regular migration.

<sup>1</sup> See [www.iom.int/sites/default/files/about-iom/migof\\_brochure\\_a4\\_en.pdf](http://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/about-iom/migof_brochure_a4_en.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> In November 2015, IOM Member States welcomed the Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF) through Council Resolution 1310.

This report complements other work that IOM is doing in partnership with the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to advance knowledge about migration governance trends globally. UN DESA and IOM have, for example, added new questions about migration governance to the UN Population and Development Inquiry. However, as the main purpose of this survey is not to collect data on migration, only a limited number of questions about migration governance could be added to this survey. For more information about this initiative, please see section 2.2.1 (Migration governance data sets with comprehensive policy coverage).

In the context of the recent international frameworks and commitments on migration and sustainable development, the MGI is a uniquely comprehensive tool to assess national migration governance that can help countries establish a baseline and monitor progress towards the achievement of the SDGs as they relate to their national migration governance, in line with their priorities. This approach can help them ensure that no migrant is left behind. The MGI methodology can also be used by countries to report on their national efforts to achieve the SDGs at the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF). Furthermore, the MGI is a unique tool that covers both immigration and emigration and studies migration governance aspects in more depth than most other existing indices.

The MGI has also developed a distinctive approach that allows for the verification of the factual correctness of the information presented, as well as ensuring country ownership and tailoring the assessment to country needs. After an introductory meeting of IOM presenting the MGI process to the government counterparts, IOM's partner, EIU, prepares a matrix with information on more than 90 migration-related indicators based on a desk review. This assessment is further enriched by key informant interviews with government officials and experts. A short report ("the MGI profile") based on the most relevant of these indicators – taking into account the priorities of the country – are then discussed at the national level during an interministerial consultation. Once endorsed by the

government, the MGI profile is then published on the Global Migration Data Portal.<sup>3</sup>

In terms of limitations, it is important to note that the MGI only looks at policy inputs, institutions and processes, but not policy implementation and policy outcomes. The latter are methodologically difficult to measure due to important structural differences across countries and contexts. Another key limitation of the MGI database that this report is based on is that definitions of migrants<sup>4</sup> and other concepts may vary across countries' legislation, policies and institutions, making a comparison of responses difficult and depending on the country context. However, the MGI considers the existence of laws, policies, institutions and processes "on paper", thus providing an indication of how common certain approaches and frameworks are. Looking at 49 MGI assessments in comparative perspective helps understand existing migration governance approaches worldwide, providing countries with examples on institutional design and policy ideas.

The following sections of the chapter will firstly set the scene by introducing the concept of migration governance, and then briefly discuss the available literature on the topic with a view to drawing out key trends highlighted in past studies to situate the findings from the MGI data in a broader context.

## 1.1. DEFINING MIGRATION GOVERNANCE

IOM defines migration governance as:

The combined frameworks of legal norms, laws and regulations, policies and traditions as well as organizational structures (subnational, national, regional and international) and the relevant processes that shape and regulate States' approaches with regard to migration in all its forms, addressing rights and responsibilities and promoting international cooperation. (IOM, 2019:136)

This definition is based on MiGOF and on a definition developed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, but can also be seen to reflect Krasner's (1983) concept of an international regime.<sup>5</sup> IOM's MiGOF lays out what governance on migration can look

<sup>3</sup> See <https://migrationdataportal.org/overviews/mgi#0>.

<sup>4</sup> In this report, the term *migrant* is used to refer to both immigrants and emigrants. When the latter two concepts are meant, immigrant or emigrant are used as terminology.

<sup>5</sup> Krasner (1983) defined *regimes* as "implicit or explicit sets of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area".

like and will be further discussed in section 3.1. (Domain 1: Migrants' rights).

Migration governance as defined above considers three aspects: (a) the **substantive** level, linked to rules, measures and principles as well as migration policies; (b) **institutional set-up**; and (c) the **procedural level**, including for example what actor is leading on policymaking (see also Martin and Weerasinghe, 2017:1). The governance process starts with agenda-setting, followed by negotiations and consensus-building, and the implementation of the new approach, including through migration law and policy reform (Acosta Arcarazo and Geddes, 2014:29; Betts, 2011:4; Krasner, 1983; Martin and Weerasinghe, 2017:25).

While this definition focuses on the State level, the involvement of other actors such as civil society and the private sector in agenda-setting and policymaking is accounted for. Furthermore, IOM's definition includes migration governance structures at municipal and city level, as well as those regulating mobility between two or more States.

The following section reviews different typologies related to migration governance at the national level that have been developed in the recent literature. Much of the focus is centred on immigration policies and typologies, with a lot less on emigration, and skewed towards a select number of countries. On emigration issues, the focus has been on diaspora engagement and trying to link them to development processes in countries of origin. The number of studies taking a comprehensive approach to migration governance remains limited.

## 1.2. MIGRATION GOVERNANCE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Existing research on migration governance tends to focus on the national level as the main point of reference, mostly because the conditions of entry, stay and exit of migrants are a matter of national sovereignty. Nevertheless, academics are increasingly analysing migration governance as a process involving institutions and organizations working at different levels – from local to national, regional and global (Caponio and Jones-Correa, 2018), in terms of different levels of inter-State cooperation – bilateral, regional, transnational and

supranational (Betts, 2011:4), as well as considering various (including non-State) actors involved (Thouez, 2018; Geddes et al., 2019:9; Scholten, 2018).

There is no formal framework for continuous international cooperation on migration at the United Nations, so international governance has been a mixture of bilateral, regional and global policies, norms, agreements and declarations which has grown slowly until recently. States have explored different avenues, individually and collectively, thus generating a multilevel international migration regime “complex” constituting different institutions, conventions and initiatives (Martin and Weerasinghe, 2017). The fragmentation can also be seen at all global migration governance levels – institutional, thematic and procedural.

National governments remain the primary actors, in particular with regards to regulating the admission, stay, exit and return of migrants, as well as engaging with other States at bilateral, regional and global levels.<sup>6</sup> Such engagement is not as well-established as in other sectors such as trade and finance. In terms of processes at the global and regional levels,<sup>7</sup> there is scope for further work to complement past and present efforts to UN and informal State-led mechanisms. These include dialogues and consultative processes to build confidence and consensus among States, mini-multilateral normative initiatives to enhance protection of migrants affected by disasters and crises, and efforts to ensure that migrants are included in decision-making on other related global issues (Martin and Weerasinghe, 2017). In addition, cooperation at the regional level exists in several forms and forums, ranging from regional free movement protocols and regional bodies to more informal venues for exchange (see for instance, Acosta Arcarazo and Geddes, 2014; and the edited volumes of Margheritis, 2018 and Geddes et al., 2019).

In geographical terms, the scholarship on migration governance focuses on policies and particularly immigration politics in Western liberal democracies. Most academic studies on migration governance focus on various aspects of immigration and integration policies, such as immigrant entry and control as well as residency, integration and naturalization issues. The cohesion of national

<sup>6</sup> Yet a shift can be seen in the increasing inclusion of non-State actors, including shifting responsibilities and outsourcing of tasks and responsibilities originally restricted to States.

<sup>7</sup> For an indication of the many activities at the local level, please see chapter 5.2 for an example.

policy on migration is diluted in many countries by ad hoc processes or structures.

Recent research has also focused on the processes of divergence or convergence of immigration and integration policies across countries. Hernes (2018) found that integration policies converged as a result of the refugee influx in 2015 for Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Each country explicitly used integration policies to decrease the number of asylum seekers, and referred to the policies in neighbouring countries to justify policy restrictions.

It has been argued that migration policies have become increasingly selective because they aim at attracting desired immigrants with certain skills and education, resulting in a certain “commodification” of migration, meaning migrants are treated almost like goods (Kuboyama, 2008). An analysis of the Determinants of International Migration: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of Policy, Origin and Destination Effects (DEMIG POLICY) data shows that migration policies studied between the Second World War and 2013 are not becoming increasingly restrictive. Nevertheless, DEMIG data indicate an increasing sophistication of policy instruments and an emphasis on skills as an instrument of migrant selection. Restrictive policy changes heavily concentrate on border control and more recently on exit measures, while integration and entry rules have become consistently less restrictive. Policies can also become more or less restrictive in practice through the discretion of State and non-State workers involved in the day-to-day administration of policy measures. Therefore, policies can become more or less restrictive in practice, even without formal policy change (de Haas et al., 2014).

Implementation of migration policies is another central issue in academic debates but controversial and difficult to measure as a globalized labour market and other structural conditions also determine migration policy effects and effectiveness (for more details, see Czaika and de Haas, 2013:494; Cornelius et al., 1994:3; Castles, 2004). Among others, research in this field looks at immigration control and why it is not entirely successful. This so-called control gap can generally be summarized as “why liberal states accept unwanted migration” (Joppke, 1998). This approach concerns the tension between open economies in need of cheap

labour and skilled migrants, and the political costs of immigration through an assumed public opinion that calls for restrictions (see Hollifield, 2004:886). Not recognizing the challenges and complex interlinkages of migration governance with other policy fields probably contributed to (perceived) policy failure and linked to it the rise in polarizing tendencies in many countries more recently (Scholten, 2018), together with the salience of immigration activating certain anti-immigrant groups (Dennison and Geddes, 2018).

The literature on emigration and typologies related to it is much smaller compared to that for immigration and equally biased towards “a receiving-country, Eurocentric perspective” (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2011:32). Much of the literature on diasporas has been dominated by single case studies rather than multi-country studies that would allow researchers to draw general lessons and take a wider view on the topic. When people leave their origin countries for various purposes, these countries can remain involved (see Agunias and Newland, 2012). Initially at least, there may be a greater need for people to stay connected but with time and change of immigration status at destination, these ties can weaken.

Diaspora<sup>8</sup> groups have the ability to influence politics in origin countries (Burgess, 2014; Adamson, 2016) and can even act as peacemakers during conflicts there (Baser and Swain, 2008). Origin countries can take measures to support their diaspora population to reach out and create an enabling environment for diasporas’ participation in the development of origin countries and communities (Brinkerhoff, 2012) and improve the data on where the diaspora population lives. The outreach policies of origin countries can fall within the domain of economic and development policies, primarily aimed at attracting diaspora investments, or to promote development at home by recognizing the contributions of their diaspora populations. These diaspora outreach policies can also consist of an extension of political rights or relate to welfare and social rights such as pensions or health care. There are a variety of other initiatives that can strengthen ties with emigrants such as diaspora conferences or a celebration of a diaspora day with awards (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2016).

<sup>8</sup> Diasporas are broadly defined as “migrants or descendants of migrants whose identity and sense of belonging, either real or symbolic, have been shaped by their migration experience and background. They maintain links with their homelands, and to each other, based on a shared sense of history, identity, or mutual experiences in the destination country.” (IOM, 2019:47)

Gamlen (2008) carried out a large cross-country comparison of diaspora policy mechanisms and distinguished two types of diaspora mechanisms through which migrant origin countries relate to diaspora: one is diaspora-building mechanisms, which cultivate and recognize diaspora communities, while the other is diaspora integration mechanisms, which draw them into reciprocal ties with their homeland. Origin countries' outreach policies that attempt to facilitate long-distance engagement of diasporas have been discussed as a process of redefining the State and its borders (Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003), as well as transnational engagement.

### **1.3. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC AND IMMIGRATION BIAS IN THE LITERATURE**

This short review indicates that few global comparisons of migration governance in different countries have been conducted, with a focus on developed countries and immigration. Even though a large proportion of migration occurs among developing countries, much of the literature and analysis are based on case studies from Western Europe or North America. This may be due to the lack of reliable data from other parts of the world, as

well as other related issues such as donor interest, structural limitations including language barriers and lack of interest, but it is a significant challenge nonetheless (Melde et al., 2014:6–7; McAuliffe and Laczko, 2016:15). In addition, most existing studies tend to focus on liberal democratic States so the typologies built through these studies may not work for other States with large immigrant and/or emigrant populations. The relevance of such (mostly immigration policy-related) regime typologies to a wider level then becomes questionable, especially for developing countries.

The MGI programme and the corresponding database presented in chapter 2 is distinctive in that it includes a focus on both developed and developing countries, and it allows for a holistic assessment of both immigration and emigration governance. Chapter 2 also compares the MGI with other data sets on migration governance. The following chapter will then present the trends and gaps seen in the 6 domains of IOM's MiGOF in 49 countries worldwide. The final sections will critically discuss the findings and links with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as well as the way forward.



## 2. THE MIGRATION GOVERNANCE INDICATORS: PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter introduces the MGI. It aims at tracing the origin and development of the MGI approach and how the data set compares to other existing ones. It further explains its methodology. In that regard, the chapter also outlines the limitations of the data analysed in this report.

The MGI is an indicators-based assessment of national migration governance frameworks, institutions and procedures. Its added value consists in the comprehensive information collected on many aspects of migration, starting from migrants' rights, to a "whole-of-government" approach, bilateral and regional cooperation, labour mobility aspects and mobility dimensions of crises, as well as how migration can be governed in a safe and orderly way.

### 2.1. THE MIGRATION GOVERNANCE INDICATORS PROCESS


Building on MiGOF, IOM – working with EIU – developed the MGI in order to help its Member States reflect on how the MiGOF definition of well-managed migration might translate into practice. The MGI is a tool based on policy inputs, which offers insights on policy elements that countries can use to develop their migration governance structures further. The MGI is not meant to rank countries on the development or implementation of migration policies, but rather to be a framework to help countries in the assessment of their migration governance structure and identify areas with potential for further development.

In addition to its analytical value, the tool also brings value added for countries through the process leading to the publication of the MGI profiles, which follows a four-step approach in each of the countries and is guided by three principles: it is voluntary, consultative and sensitive to local specificities.

Step 1: The IOM Country Office organizes a briefing in the country for government officials to introduce what the MGI entails and ensure country ownership. It is usually during this preliminary phase that the Country Office identifies key government counterparts that will be involved throughout the MGI process, through informal cooperation with IOM's Country Office during its revision of the draft MGI matrix and the MGI profile.

Step 2: The EIU collects and analyses data and drafts the MGI matrix based on 90 indicators grounded in the six dimensions of MiGOF (see section 2.3 and Annex II for details on what is included in the matrix). A draft MGI profile presenting a summary of the key findings on priority areas of migration governance that were identified by the government is shared with those counterparts. For more information on this step, please refer to the methodology section (see section 2.3).

Step 3: The national government convenes an interministerial consultation where relevant ministries and other stakeholders discuss the practices and areas that could be strengthened according to the draft MGI profile. The consultation is an opportunity for participants to comment on the draft profile so that it reflects the challenges specific to their country, as well as their priorities in terms of migration governance. This is also a chance for different ministries to exchange on what they are working on with regards to migration and ensure coordination and coherence. More importantly, the consultation is an opportunity for the government to discuss the way forward and how they would like to address some of the areas identified for potential development. The fact that these consultations are interministerial in nature helps develop and strengthen a whole-of-government approach in practice, and fosters reflection across different government departments.



Source: IOM, 2018.

Step 4: Based on the comments received during the consultation, IOM finalizes the MGI Profile for final validation by the government. The MGI Profile is then uploaded to the Global Migration Data Portal where it can be accessed by everyone.<sup>9</sup> The full MGI matrix is only shared with the government.

Through this consultative process, the MGI allows governments to identify and discuss gaps, opportunities and priorities, which in turn can help them: (a) identify gaps that need to be addressed; (b) establish baselines to track progress on national and international commitments and (c) develop comprehensive migration strategies based on evidence.

## 2.2. THE MIGRATION GOVERNANCE INDICATORS AND OTHER DATA SETS ON MIGRATION GOVERNANCE

As mentioned earlier, in recent years, an increasing number of academics, think tanks and international organizations have analysed migration policies and developed indices to measure different aspects of migration governance and related concepts. Data sets and metrics largely reflect the geographical bias and focus on immigration policies present in the corresponding analytical frameworks (see section 1.2: Migration governance at the national level). While the number of approaches to define and analyse migration governance is increasing,

relatively little is known about countries' national migration governance frameworks.

A comparative analysis of existing benchmarking tools, indices and dashboards (see Table 1) shows a few trends. Firstly, the data sets vary considerably in the number of countries and years covered, the number of indicators and thus aspects covered, and the accessibility of data. This can in part be explained by research often being dependent on project funding, which hampers continuity and the collection of longitudinal data and thus comparison across years. Data sets quickly become outdated because they are not updated after funding of multi-year projects end. A second notable trend is the focus on a relatively limited group of countries, in particular the Member States of the OECD.

While the datasets analysed in this report do not aim to be exhaustive and may not be fully comparable with the MGI database, contrasting them with the MGI helps to draw out similarities and differences for some issues, underscoring the innovative and comprehensive nature of the MGI.

Scipioni and Urso (2018:10) divided migration policy indices into sectoral ones focusing on a particular policy area only, and more comprehensive frameworks that cover more than one issue of migration policy. Many of the indices reviewed there are comprehensive in their approach as they study different policy aspects related to migration

<sup>9</sup> See <https://migrationdataportal.org/overviews/mgi>.



governance usually among different countries. Some previous data sets and indices, especially before the 2010s, focused on single policy areas. Some of those approaches are discussed at the end of this subsection.

The data sets on different aspects of migration governance with the number of countries and years they cover, the number of indicators they study, and whether they are publicly available, are presented in Table 1.<sup>10</sup>

Table 1. Migration policy data sets

## Migration policy indices

Available data on how countries regulate migration



INDEX/DATASET	COUNTRIES COVERED	INDICATORS COVERED*	YEARS COVERED	PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
World Population Policies Database	197	29	1940-2010	✓
SDG indicator 10.7.2	111	1 (30 sub-categories)	1940-2010	✓
Electoral Law Indicators (ELECLAW) (measures the degree of inclusion of electoral laws)	51	6	1940-2010	✓
Global Migration Barometer (ranks countries on how attractive and accessible they are for migrants)	61	32	1940-2010	✗
MGI	50	about 90	1940-2010	✓
Migrant Rights Indicators (constructs and analyses two indices that measure the openness of labour immigration programmes and the legal rights granted to migrant workers after admission)	46		1940-2010	✓

<sup>10</sup> [https://esa.un.org/poppolicy/wpp\\_datasets.aspx](https://esa.un.org/poppolicy/wpp_datasets.aspx)  
<https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/>  
<http://globalcit.eu/electoral-law-indicator/>  
<http://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/a-new-global-migration-barometer-measures-opportunities-for-migrants>  
<https://migrationdataportal.org/overviews/mgi>  
[www.imi-n.org/data/demig-data/demig-policy-1](http://www.imi-n.org/data/demig-data/demig-policy-1)  
<http://globalcit.eu/citizenship-law-indicators/>  
<http://labos.ulg.ac.be/socialprotection/about/>  
[www.mipex.eu/](http://www.mipex.eu/)  
[www.impic-project.eu/](http://www.impic-project.eu/)  
[www.cgdev.org/publication/commitment-development-index-2018](http://www.cgdev.org/publication/commitment-development-index-2018)  
<https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/impala/home>  
[www.giga-hamburg.de/en/node/19485](http://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/node/19485)  
[www.queensu.ca/mcp/home](http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/home)  
<https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/nbrnberwo/14833.htm>  
[www.oecd.org/dev/migration-development/knomad-dashboard.htm](http://www.oecd.org/dev/migration-development/knomad-dashboard.htm)  
<https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/907/>  
[www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1162355](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1162355)

INDEX/ DATASET	COUNTRIES COVERED	INDICATORS COVERED*	YEARS COVERED	PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
Determinants of International Migration (DEMIG)	45	51	1940-2010	✓
Citizenship Law Indicators (CITLAW)	42	6 (calculated from 45 basic indicators)	1940-2010	✓
Migration and Transnational Social Protection in (post-)crisis Europe (MiTSoPro)	40			✗
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)	38	167	1940-2010	✓
Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC)	33	69	1940-2010	✓
Commitment to Development Index (ranks 27 richest countries on their dedication to policies that benefit people living in poorer nations and has migration as one of its seven components)	27	6	1940-2010	✓
International Migration Policy and Law Analysis (IMPALA)	25		1940-2010	✗
Emigrant Policies Index (EMIX)	22	102	1940-2010	✓
Multiculturalism Policy Index	21		1940-2010	✗
Cerna's Index	20	6	1940-2010	✗
Ortega and Peri's Index	14		1940-2010	✗
Policy and Institutional Coherence for Migration and Development (PICMD)	10			✗
Immigrant Climate Index (ICI)	1		1940-2010	✗

Source: Own elaboration based on websites or articles of each index.

Note: A related index, the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), also measures migration governance but focuses on integration policies instead of migration policies. For further information please refer to the thematic page on Integration.

\* Number of indicators can vary by country or year.

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### 2.2.1. Migration governance data sets with comprehensive policy coverage

UN DESA produces the World Population Policies Database that provides migration data for 196 countries and areas on the evolution of government policies on various international and internal migration issues. However, it has not been updated since 2015, and not all variables are available for all years, although they mostly align with the MGI. The UN Inquiry among Governments on Population and Development contains a migration module that is jointly administered by UN DESA and IOM with the support of OECD, to collect country-level data on SDG indicator 10.7.2 (“Number of countries with migration policies that facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people”). It is based on IOM’s MiGOF (and some insights from the MGI) and thus comparable to the MGI but goes less into depth since it only includes scores (such as binary yes/no or categorical answers) with no text justifying or elaborating on the rationale behind these scores, and it is based on self-reporting by governments. The OECD’s PICMD dashboard aimed to measure the extent to which public policies and institutional arrangements are coherent with international best practices but has only covered 10 countries so far.

Among academic efforts to assess migration governance, the DEMIG project tracked more than 6,500 migration policy changes from 45 countries, thus also including a relatively large group of countries from outside Western Europe and Northern America. It differs from the MGI as it focuses on tracking whether the different policy changes resulted in more restrictiveness or less restrictiveness over time. DEMIG also codes each policy change according to policy area, policy tool, migrant group and migrant origin.

### 2.2.2. Migration governance data sets limited to specific policy areas

In terms of indices focusing on specific topics only, several authors created tools or indices to measure policy restrictiveness related to integration and naturalization outcomes (Koopmans, et al., 2012). The classifications, especially on immigration entry, are weakened by indicators of questionable validity, and approaches examining admission and integration/citizenship regimes independently

of each other ignore a possible immigration–integration policy nexus (Boucher and Gest, 2014).

The IMPALA database looks at various aspects related to immigration law and policy in a relatively small sample with 25 countries, but over a period of 50 years that facilitates comparison. The basis for the selection of countries included was the criteria of heterogeneity “to identify indicators that work across a wide range of immigration regimes” (Gest et al., 2014:268) – a similar approach to selecting countries is also being taken as part of the MGI.

The IMPIC database provides a set of quantitative indices to measure immigration policies in 33 OECD countries but only from 1980 to 2010, so a shorter time period than IMPALA (Helbling et al., 2017). With a much more confined geographical focus, Cerna’s Index measures policy openness and restrictiveness targeting highly skilled immigrants for 20 countries in 2007 and 2012. Ortega and Peri’s Index studies the effects of policy restrictions on immigration flows for 14 countries between 1980 and 2005. Both these indices can thus be compared to the DEMIG project approach that focused on restrictions as well, but Cerna’s and Ortega and Peri’s approach are much smaller in scope both thematically and geographically.

The MIPEX database measures one specific aspect of migration governance: integration of immigrants in 38 receiving countries. Some of its variables have been taken up in the MGI, and the overall MIPEX can be used as a complementary data set to understand migration governance of a specific subfield that the MIPEX uniquely and extensively covers. The CITLAW database measures the degree of inclusion and freedom of choice for non-nationals in acquiring citizenship,<sup>11</sup> while the ELECLAW database measures the degree of inclusion of the electoral voting rights and uniquely covering the right to stand for candidacy for non-resident citizens (emigrants) and resident non-citizens (immigrants). Both the CITLAW and the ELECLAW data sets are comparable to some of the indicators in the MGI and can serve to cross-check information. The EMIX database studies “emigrant policies” of Latin American and Caribbean origin countries, including ties with their diaspora population and thus provides another piece in the migration governance puzzle across regions and topics. Information related to emigrant policies and efforts by the origin country to keep

<sup>11</sup> The same team also produces Global Birthright Indicators on how citizenship is acquired (or not) at birth, covering 177 countries for 2016 data, including the 42 countries covered by CITLAW, but are less detailed than CITLAW indicators.

their links with the diaspora population can be used for comparison with MGI questions related to diaspora members, but only for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, so comparison will be limited to those.

Overall, the MGI are a relatively newer database with data collected between 2015 and 2019, so there are several data sets that are more comprehensive given that their data spans several decades. For example, UN DESA collected data from 1970–2015 and the DEMIG project provided information for the period from 1945–2013. Other data sets that include data for a decade or more include IMPIC, the Center for Global Development's Commitment to Development Index, IMPALA and Ortega and Peri's Index. On the other end, there are other data sets with data collected only for a few years. For example, the Global Migration Barometer only has data from 2007, while others such as CITLAW, EMIX, ELECLAW, Martin Ruhs' Migrant Rights Indicators, MIPEX, Multiculturalism Policy Index, Cerna's Index have collected data for a couple of years only.

Data sets that only focus on particular migration policy areas provide extensive information on them and thus provide more information than MGI indicators for the specific issue, but they are not as comprehensive as the MGI. For example, information relating to immigration law and policy is more comprehensive in the IMPALA database or information on integration of immigrants is more detailed in the MIPEX. Similar data sets include Cerna's Index, Ortega and Peri's Index, MiTSoPro, CITLAW and ELECLAW, Global Migration Barometer, but these are usually smaller in scope and scale.

As this analysis has shown, relatively few indices take a comprehensive approach in covering both immigration and emigration aspects of migration governance. Many tend to focus on immigration, which leads to the risk of duplication. Taking not only legal provisions but also processes and institutions into account makes the MGI a unique tool that goes much more into depth than most other comparable data sets and approaches (cf. Scipioni and Urso, 2018:47).

### 2.3. METHODOLOGY

This report builds on data collected in 49 countries between 2015 and 2019 through the MGI project. For the full list of countries that took part in the process, please refer to Annex I.

The collection and analysis of data is conducted by the EIU, based on more than 90 indicators grounded in the 6 dimensions of MiGOF (migrants' rights, "whole-of-government" approach, well-being of migrants, partnerships, mobility dimension of crises, and safe, orderly and regular migration).

EIU conducts a desk review for each country and complements it with a number of key informant interviews over the phone. Those counterparts are identified with the support of the IOM office in the respective country and represent key ministries that can help ensure the MGI assessment does not overlook information that is not available online and can thus not be analysed during EIU's desk review. One of the main added values of the MGI is the fact that government representatives are interviewed during the data collection phase, and they also review the results for factual correctness.

For each question of the indicator framework, the MGI assessment includes a response (often a binary yes/no score, or yes/partially/no) and justifications for these responses. The outcome of the MGI assessment is a draft results matrix for each country that consists of more than 90 rows (one per MGI indicator/subindicator).

This matrix is then reviewed by IOM, in consultation with the national government. The key well-developed areas, as well as the key areas for potential development are presented in a draft MGI Profile. Once all comments from the government are incorporated and the counterparts have endorsed the publication to ensure political buy-in and ownership, the profile is published on the Global Migration Data Portal.<sup>12</sup>

The original MGI methodology developed for the first round of MGI assessments is described in detail in a previous publication from the EIU and will therefore not be presented here. That publication referred to the Migration Governance Index because the original idea for the project was to produce a score associated with the overall migration governance framework in each country (EIU, 2016:11–12). However, since the MGI was

<sup>12</sup> See <https://migrationdataportal.org/overviews/mgi>.

conceived as a context-specific assessment of migration governance rather than as a tool to rank countries, subsequent MGI assessments only produced a list of indicators without producing an overall index.

### 2.3.1. An overview of Migration Governance Indicators countries

As illustrated in Table 1 and Annex I, the MGI assessment has been conducted in almost all regions of the world. Countries assessed were selected with the purpose of ensuring geographical balance, as well as a coverage of countries at different levels of human development. Practical considerations were also taken into account, particularly the interest and engagement of governments, as well as the capacity of IOM's country missions.

The countries covered in the sample include countries with different levels of net migration rates: some of them are mostly countries of origin, some of transit and others of destination. In particular, 62.5 per cent of MGI countries have a negative net migration rate,<sup>13</sup> which means that the number of emigrants is higher than the number of immigrants (17% of those countries have a negligible net migration rate, i.e. not above -0.5, which means they host an almost equal number of immigrants compared to emigrants that left the country); while 37.5 per cent of them have a positive migration rate, highlighting that they are predominantly countries of origin of migrants.

The countries covered range across the broad spectrum of high to low levels of human development.

Table 2. MGI countries by region<sup>a</sup>

UN region <sup>b</sup>	Total number of countries in region <sup>c</sup>	Number of countries covered by MGI	Percentage of UN Member States covered by the MGI (as of June 2019)
Americas	33	14	42%
Africa	54	14	26%
Asia	47	11	23%
Europe	42	8	19%
Oceania	14	2	14%

Source: Own elaboration based on UN DESA, 2019 data on regions.

Notes: a For the full list of MGI countries covered, please see Annex 1.

b According to UN DESA's list of geographic regions that presents the composition of geographical regions used by the Statistics Division in its publications and databases. Each country is shown in one region only. These geographic regions are based on continental regions, which are further subdivided into subregions and intermediary regions drawn to obtain greater homogeneity in sizes of population, demographic circumstances and accuracy of demographic statistics. Available at <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/>

c The list of UN Member States can be found at [www.un.org/en/member-states/](http://www.un.org/en/member-states/) (accessed on 2 July 2019). Not all countries listed in the UN regions are UN Member States and only UN Member States have been considered for this table. The boundaries and names and the designations used do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations or IOM.

Table 3. MGI countries by Human Development Index rank<sup>a</sup>

HDI rank	Total number of countries at this HDI rank worldwide	Number of countries covered by MGI <sup>b</sup>
Very high human development	59	10
High human development	53	16
Medium human development	39	14
Low human development	38	8

Source: Own elaboration based on UNDP, 2019.

Notes: a The Human Development Index (HDI) is a measure based on three dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI approach focuses on people and their capabilities instead of only economic growth to measure the development level of a country and is thus considered more holistic. Available at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI>

b For the full list of MGI countries covered, please see Annex I. HDI data for Tuvalu are not available.

<sup>13</sup> The net migration rate is calculated by the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants over a period, divided by the person-years lived by the population of the receiving country over that period. It is expressed as an average annual number of migrants per 1,000 population (UN DESA Population Division, *World Population Prospects 2017* (2017), available at <https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Migration/> (accessed 1 April 2019).

### 2.3.2. Global database-building

As previously mentioned, the four MGI rounds used slightly different versions of the MGI matrix (and indicators' framework). As a consequence, all MGI matrices were coded by IOM over the first three months of 2019 to ensure that all variables from all MGI countries could be compared in the new database. This only meant ensuring that the format of the data was standardized, but there was no need to alter the data. This global database brings together all data from the MGI countries that is contained in the MGI matrices rather than the (much shorter) MGI profiles.

In order to minimize errors associated with the non-final nature of some matrices included in the global MGI database, the authors conducted a series of standardized data quality checks, and changes that were deemed necessary due to the results of these data checks were applied to all countries and all variables in a systematic way.

### 2.3.3. Data analysis

As a first step, a descriptive statistical analysis of the database was conducted to get insights about all MGI indicators, and it looked at trends that emerged when looking at justifications for the scores to complete the picture on all MGI indicators.

Building on this first analysis, data were analysed by MGI dimension, trying to identify global patterns for each of the six dimensions. The outcome of this analysis is presented in chapter 3. It should be noted that some of the MiGOF dimensions overlap; thus, an effort was made to present the results by topic in only one place where this is the case.

In the last step of data analysis, three general aspects of migration governance were studied.

First and based on the main findings in the literature review in chapter 1, the analysis centred on how comprehensive migration governance frameworks are and whether they focus mostly on immigration, particularly on emigration or both. For example, indicators related to the entry and stay in the country (visa regulations, policies on migrant integration) were counted as immigration-focused; indicators on diaspora and/or nationals abroad as emigration-focused; those related to all aspects of migration – for instance having an overall

national migration strategy – would be considered as applying to both.

Second, the report looks at the prevailing migration governance framework approach in each of the MGI countries (development/rights/security or immigration control focus). In order to run this analysis, indicators related to predominantly economic issues such as remittances and diaspora contributions would be considered related to the development approach. Indicators on migrants' rights – for instance, the right to vote or the right to be self-employed for immigrants – would be considered indicators related to the rights approach; those on border management and other security issues such as managing immigrants in times of disasters or crises would be considered indicators related to the security approach.

Finally, the analysis looks at indicators by focus area: policy coherence and rule of law, international cooperation, economic migration, integration and/or crisis/disasters and displacement. Concretely, IOM identified indicators that could be directly attributed to each of these dimensions – as explained in the preceding paragraphs – and looked at how many indicators within each focus area had a “yes” response (meaning that the governance framework of the country covers that aspect). The higher the percentage of yes responses, the more comprehensive that governance dimension is. In other words, the prevalence of yes scores was taken as a proxy for the level of comprehensiveness of that area/focus of migration governance, regardless of the specific context.

### 2.3.4. Limitations

Three of the main limitations of this report are linked to the general limitations of the MGI, while two are specific to comparing the migration policies of different countries.

First, the MGI focuses on rules and regulations, policies, institutions, operational structures and coordinating mechanisms of countries. It is important to note that the MGI does not focus on policy implementation and policy outcomes, partly because they are methodologically difficult to assess due to the high number of other intervening factors, which is a limitation of all such policy indices (see also Scipioni and Urso, 2018:3). The high specificity of policy implementation would not be captured

easily through a standard framework to be applied to many countries worldwide. Assessing policy outcomes would be difficult given the high number of contextual and intervening factors, as well as the comprehensiveness of the MGI that covers many migration-related governance areas.

Second, the MGI methodology strikes a balance in the inevitable trade-off between creating a standardized methodology that works for all countries and tailoring the approach to the country context. In practice, the standardized element of the MGI methodology is constituted by the standard MGI indicators and associated scores in the matrix that apply to all countries; when looking at the matrix from the perspective of a country, some questions are more relevant, others are less relevant, depending on country priorities. The specificities of different countries emerge from an analysis of the justifications that are usually 100 to 200 words long, as well as in the priority topics covered in the MGI profiles, as not all 90 indicators are analysed there.

Third, because data analysis was conducted in parallel to the finalization of some MGI assessments, data had to be included as of 31 March 2019. This means that some final changes in the MGI matrices (and profiles) are not reflected in the global database used for this analysis. Nevertheless, IOM took a standardized approach to the inclusion of matrices in the database, with a standard cut-off for all countries, in order to ensure that inaccuracies in the database are random and that there is no bias.

Comparing governance data from different countries is difficult for many reasons, two of which stand out. First, different definitions of migrants are used in different countries, so while the assessment is standardized, it is difficult to draw general lessons from policies or processes that may look similar, but they target different populations because of different definitions – for instance, of who is an immigrant.

MGI questions use a variety of terms to distinguish between different types of migrants while asking questions on a range of migration governance issues. Examples of different terms used include immigrants, emigrants, foreign residents, temporary legal residents, nationals and non-nationals, citizens, international students, nationals living/working abroad, diaspora members, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returning migrants and migrants in transit. The use of the different terms in the responses, however, were based on the formulations in policy documents for each country and thus were not uniform, as it is not possible to use a unified definition and check if the national legislation for instance applies to that definition. Nevertheless, since the MGI does not assess policy implementation and policy outcomes, this problem does not hinder the analysis of existing migration governance frameworks on paper.

Secondly, the MGI assessments were conducted at different points in time between 2015 and 2019, and the MGI database has not been updated for countries who conducted an assessment before 2019. Updating the database will be a priority for the MGI project in the near future.

The MGI approach seeks to assess the legal policy, as well as institutional and procedural frameworks of countries at the national level. It closely involves governmental and non-governmental actors in verifying the information and discussing how it can be used to affect change at the country level.

Compared to other data sets, the MGI is relatively broad in the wide array of aspects of migration governance that are covered and in the unique combination of countries from all continents. Nonetheless, the data have their limits in terms of comparability, which should be kept in mind for the next chapter on key trends emerging across countries.





# 3. TRENDS AND GAPS IN MIGRATION GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS WORLDWIDE

This section presents the results from the global MGI database that includes data from 49 countries. The information is organized around the six domains of IOM's MiGOF as a starting point:

- (a) Migrants' rights;
- (b) "Whole-of-government" approach;
- (c) Partnerships;
- (d) Well-being of migrants;
- (e) Mobility dimensions of crises; and
- (f) Safe, orderly and regular migration.

The MGI data highlight that overall migration governance in terms of cooperation with other countries exists across countries. Legal and policy frameworks, institutionalization and processes on migration are less or more unevenly advanced in the other five domains (migrants' rights, "whole-of-government" approach, well-being of migrants, mobility dimensions of crises and safe, orderly and regular migration). The next subsections will provide the data in more detail by each dimension.

## 3.1. DOMAIN 1: MIGRANTS' RIGHTS

Respecting, fulfilling and protecting the rights of migrants, in line with international law, is an essential principle of migration governance. Indicators in this domain assess the extent to which non-nationals have the same status as citizens in terms of access to basic social services, such as health care, education and social security. Domain 1 equally covers the rights of migrants to family reunification to work and to residency and citizenship, as well as the right to vote.

### 3.1.1. Migrants' access to social services

Social services, such as health-care and social protection, constitute basic public services. Access for immigrants varies across countries. Of the 49 countries that took part in MGI assessments, 47 provided the same access to government-funded **health-care services** to immigrants as to citizens (the two exceptions are countries with high emigration and lower immigration). A substantial proportion of countries (43%) provide access to health services regardless of the legal status of immigrants, thus including those in an irregular situation. A slightly lower percentage of countries (41%) provides public health-care services to immigrants but with some limitations related to their legal status: usually, they provide health care to those in a regular situation. In some cases, they also provide it to immigrants in an irregular situation, especially for immediate needs or if not providing it would pose a public health hazard. Finally, a few countries (12%) – mostly countries with negative net migration rates (fewer immigrants than emigrants) – only provide emergency health care to immigrants.

For **social protection**,<sup>14</sup> the picture is more varied. A fifth of the MGI countries do not provide access to social protection to immigrants. A third of them provides all immigrants with equal access to social protection as nationals, while 35 per cent of them offer access to social protection to some immigrant categories, such as long-term residents, residents on family reunion permits and/or certain categories of residents on temporary work permits. Some countries also restrict access to those with a minimum period of residence in the country.

<sup>14</sup> Understood as "the set of public and private policies and programmes aimed at preventing, reducing and eliminating economic and social vulnerabilities to poverty and deprivation" (IOM, 2019:197).

Many countries devise agreements with other countries on the **portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits**, including old-age pensions (over half in the MGI sample). Some States thus allow immigrants to access their pensions once they have returned to their origin countries. Several countries are part of regional agreements in this field, including the Multilateral Ibero-American Agreement, agreements among European Union Member States, the Southern African Development Community's Code on Social Security and agreements between Gulf Cooperation Council States.

### 3.1.2. The right to family life

The right to family life is protected through national family reunification schemes. However, family reunification schemes may have different definitions of what constitutes a “family”, depending on the country. Nonetheless, this admission category can be a key regular pathway to immigrate into certain countries and represents an important way to foster integration and protection. In 37 per cent of MGI countries for which data are available,<sup>15</sup> family reunification is possible for all immigrants in all visa or residency categories. Over half (55%) of the countries allow family reunification for immigrants in some types of visa or residence category, while 8 per cent of them do not allow for any form of family reunification. In addition, all the 20 countries that responded stated that there are no limitations related to personal characteristics, such as skill level or gender for family reunification.

### 3.1.3. Access to employment for immigrants

Being able to work is an important way for immigrants to integrate into host societies. Employment can include the private sector or entrepreneurship, and also the public sector in some countries. As concerns access to **employment** opportunities, countries tend to offer preferential treatment to immigrants on longer term residency permits. Less than a fifth (16%) of MGI countries limit access to work to permanent residents. The majority of countries in the MGI sample (37%) provide all permanent residents, as well as residents on temporary permits of less than a year (excluding those on seasonal employment) and residents on family reunion permits with the same access to

employment as nationals. Of the MGI countries, 31 per cent provide equal access to employment as to nationals for two of the three categories of residency permit holders mentioned above. Of these States, 16 per cent do not provide equal access to employment to non-citizens.

Temporary workers with permits can usually change jobs, but they need to apply for new permits or visa through the new employer. In some cases, they face further limiting conditions for access to employment that apply to foreign residents, such as linguistic testing (27% of countries); in addition, certain sectors and activities may be limited to nationals (16% of the sample), such as in the security sector, medical or legal services.

**Public sector employment** is much more restricted for non-nationals. The exercise of public authority, such as police and national security-related jobs, is limited to nationals in all MGI countries. As concerns public employment in other areas, a third of countries enable all foreign residents to accept employment in the public sector under the same conditions as nationals, and 39 per cent of the MGI countries limit public sector employment exclusively to their nationals. In most countries, foreigners cannot work for the host government under the same conditions as nationals.

**Self-employment** is an important motor of entrepreneurship and economic development. Immigrants can bring important skills and knowledge, especially in areas where their skills are in great demand. In almost one out of five MGI countries, foreign residents do not have the same access to self-employment as nationals. In 41 per cent of the countries, permanent residents, residents on temporary permits of less than a year (excluding seasonal employment) and residents on family reunion permits can all run their own business or otherwise work independently, while in 12 per cent of the countries, this is allowed for permanent residents, and in 29 per cent of countries for two out of the three categories (permanent residents and those on temporary permits or on family reunion permits). To obtain a specific permit such as an investor visa, some countries require a certain minimum amount of funds to be invested in the country, annual income or turnover necessary. Some countries include time specifications for the length of residency before a foreign resident can open a business or become an investor. Yet other

<sup>15</sup> Data is only available for 20 out of the 49 MGI countries because the indicator was only included for the last two rounds of MGI assessments.

countries may identify and publish which sectors have a need for business development.

#### 3.1.4. Access to citizenship

Paths to citizenship can be an important step towards the integration of long-term residents. Except for one country, all MGI countries for which information is available (46 countries) provide a path towards citizenship for immigrants, ranging from a timeline of minimum 0–5 years (35%) of residency in the country to 5–10 years (43%) and more than 10 years (14%). Thus, in most countries, immigrants can attain citizenship in less than 10 years, provided that they comply with the requirements of the receiving country.<sup>16</sup>

#### 3.1.5. Protection for emigrants

Many countries have established mechanisms to protect the rights of their citizens working abroad (39% fully developed instruments, 31% partially). In most countries, this takes the form of nationals being able to contact their embassies and consulates for support. Formal agreements are often helpful in protecting labour migrants (for an overview of these agreements, see section 3.3). Several major countries of origin further provide mandatory pre-departure training and briefings to inform potential labour migrants about their rights and interests and provide guidance on how to proceed if their rights are violated. Some dedicated consular units abroad also monitor the protection of rights of migrants from the respective country.

#### 3.1.6. Migrants and the right to vote

Casting one's ballot is an important part of civic engagement. Of the 20 countries which answered this question,<sup>17</sup> 11 grant the right to vote to their nationals who reside abroad and usually make such services available through their embassies and consular offices abroad. In five countries, emigrants can partially participate in national elections, for instance only for a determined period of time. And four of the remaining countries do not allow their citizens abroad to cast their ballot in elections.

As non-nationals are concerned, hardly any country grants foreign residents the right to vote in national elections, and only few do so in local elections. One country in the sample allows all foreign residents to vote in at least one type of local elections. Of the remaining, over 65 per cent of the countries that responded do not allow legally residing non-residents to vote in local elections, while 23 per cent of countries grant this right to certain categories of residents or visa holders such as only immigrants from countries with some colonial or historical ties. Some countries also have additional time limit of residency periods required for being able to vote in municipal or other local elections.

### 3.2. DOMAIN 2: “WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT” APPROACH

The second principle of IOM's MiGOF focuses on the formulation of migration policy using evidence and a “whole-of-government” approach. Indicators in this domain assess the underlying migration legislation and regulations, and the institutional set-up for governing migration at multiple levels, including interministerial coordination mechanisms for horizontal policy coherence. The domain also reviews the existence of national migration strategies and their coherence with development policies. Indicators further cover the availability and sharing of data on migration of both immigrants and emigrants.

#### 3.2.1. The substantive level: Migration legislation and strategies

Regulations, laws and policies form a core part of migration governance. Almost all countries have enacted **immigration legislation** (96%); 61 per cent have adopted laws on managing emigration of nationals. For some of those countries that do not have any specific emigration legislation, some labour migration policies cover emigration for work reasons, and a diaspora policy may also cover this to a certain extent, though being less focused on legal provisions.

<sup>16</sup> For comparison, the weighted overall length of residence required for citizenship in the 42 European States covered by the Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT) in 2011 ranges from 3 to 20 years (see pages 28 to 31 of GLOBALCIT's explanatory note for details on how it is weighted, available at [http://globalcit.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CITLAW\\_3.0.pdf](http://globalcit.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CITLAW_3.0.pdf)). The average length of residence requirement in the 38 MIPEX countries is seven years (see [www.mipex.eu/access-nationality](http://www.mipex.eu/access-nationality)).

<sup>17</sup> Data is only available for 20 out of the 49 MGI countries because the indicator was only included for the last two rounds of MGI assessments.

An **overall migration strategy** can be taken as a country's shift from a reactive migration policy framework to a more proactive and extensive framework. Strategic approaches covering all aspects of migration (thus, including immigration and emigration) do not exist in all countries. Over half (55%) of the countries defined their national migration strategy in a programmatic document or manifesto, and 16 per cent have a strategy but no implementation plan. The remaining countries (29%) have not adopted a strategy yet or have a draft strategy that is not approved yet, or they have several programmatic documents dealing with distinct aspects of migration but no overall document. Integrating gender concerns can include addressing the different situations and needs of people of different gender and age groups, as well as promoting gender equality and women's empowerment. Only one of the 10 countries assessed on this question<sup>18</sup> developed such a gender-responsive migration strategy, and another country promotes gender equality in principle but without concrete measures linked to it.

**The relationship between migration policy and development policy** constitutes one of the most recognized links between human mobility and other policy areas, not least in the SDGs. There is an increasing recognition of the importance of maximizing the benefits of migration for development, particularly by mainstreaming migration into development planning. Of the MGI countries, 39 per cent reported that they aligned their migration strategy – where it exists – with national development strategies, while 24 per cent of countries are doing this to some extent. So more than a third of countries (37%) do not integrate migration issues into their development frameworks, which would be important given the universal approach of the UN Agenda 2030 on Sustainable Development.

### 3.2.2. Institutions

The MGI includes indicators pertaining to the institutional framework of each country, including which ministry or agency leads on migration issues and how and if coordination with other ministries takes place, and whether formally or informally.

Two thirds of MGI countries report having a **government agency or department that is responsible for designing and coordinating the implementation of the overall migration policy or strategic plan**, and almost one in three (27%) has a partial arrangement, which means that responsibilities are either shared or they are within a unit that also deals with other matters. Of the countries, 6 per cent do not have a government agency or department in charge of migration policies. In some countries, multiple agencies focus on specific aspects and share the responsibilities, but there may be tensions when the division of responsibilities and labour are not clear among the different agencies.

The **“whole-of-government” approach**, by definition, entails the need to involve other State actors in a coherent way. From the countries that responded, exactly half (50%) have an interministerial coordination mechanism on migration issues at the national level, while 35 per cent have a partial arrangement in place. This could either mean that members of the coordination group meet no more than twice a year (including on an ad hoc basis), or that only three institutions or less are involved. Finally, 10 per cent of the MGI countries do not have an established coordination mechanism, and 2 countries neither have an institution in charge of migration nor are they fostering horizontal policy coherence through interministerial bodies.

Thus, while most countries aim at ensuring horizontal policy coherence (among ministries) to some extent, a smaller number of them are making efforts to enhance vertical policy coherence (16 countries do, 19 countries do so partially, and 7 countries do not) among different levels of government, from national to local.

Almost four out of five (78%) MGI countries have a dedicated government entity or agency (such as a border agency) responsible for enacting **immigration policy**, while 14 per cent have a partial set-up with, for instance, multiple ministries/agencies responsible for implementing the immigration policy instead of being spearheaded by a single agency. Of the MGI countries, 8 per cent do not have a dedicated agency or entity dealing with immigration policy, which means that the large majority has an institutional arrangement on immigration in place.

<sup>18</sup> As added in the last round of the MGI only.

In contrast, 27 per cent of MGI countries do not have a dedicated government entity or agency focusing on operationalizing **emigration policy and diaspora issues**; 61 per cent of them have such an institution, and 12 per cent have a partially coordinated set-up. The institutionalization of immigration is thus more advanced than on emigration, which could be due to most countries not having a diaspora agency on immigration countries.

**Assistance to nationals residing abroad** is available for nationals of all MGI countries. However, the geographical coverage varies, with 35 per cent of them only being able to offer those services in less than 50 countries, and 37 per cent having dependencies in 50 to 100 countries. This is probably an issue of resources for establishing such institutions and providing related services.

### 3.2.3. Availability and sharing of migration-related data for policy

Basing policies on facts and not perceptions is one of the guiding aspects of principle 2 of IOM's MiGOF. While the MGI does not assess the use of existing information for policy, the MGI does look at whether a country collects and publishes migration data on a regular basis and if the data are disaggregated by sex.

Of the 41 countries that responded, 61 per cent<sup>19</sup> include **migration questions in their national census** (such as on citizenship or country of birth), while another 14 per cent include questions partially related to migration. Of the countries, 8 per cent do not collect any migration-related information in their regular censuses, which tend to be the most robust source of data on the topic.<sup>20</sup> Besides census data, half of the MGI countries that responded collect and publish migration data on a regular basis, while an additional 39 per cent does but not in a regular fashion, and the remaining 10 per cent do not. Except for one country, all countries for whom data are available either collect migration information in censuses or from other sources, but not necessarily disaggregated by sex. Of the 21 countries that answered this question, 8 countries collect and publish migration data disaggregated by sex, and 7 do so partially, meaning the data are not updated regularly or are limited.

The majority of MGI countries collect **data on emigrants and diaspora members**. In the MGI sample, 12 per cent of the countries do not keep any records of nationals living abroad. Some countries collect this information indirectly, for instance through electoral registration in embassies abroad. In other cases, even though citizens are supposed to report themselves to embassies when they move abroad, this does not always happen in practice.

## 3.3. DOMAIN 3: PARTNERSHIPS

The third principle of the MiGOF focuses on “engagement with partners to address migration and related issues”. Indicators in this domain focus on bilateral, regional and global cooperation. Migration across borders, by definition, involves the jurisdiction of at least two countries, and States have long recognized the added value of cooperating to ensure the protection and safety of migrants while upholding national sovereignty. Partnerships in this domain further include non-State actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), diaspora members and the private sector.

### 3.3.1. Legal provisions relating to partnerships

Cooperation on migration-related issues is particularly advanced at bilateral, and to a lesser degree, regional level. Of the MGI countries, 90 per cent signed at least one bilateral memorandum of understanding (MoU)<sup>21</sup> with another country, thus highlighting that only few countries manage migration unilaterally. The MoUs signed by MGI countries differ widely in terms of sectors covered, spanning from labour migration (including specific professions) to trafficking in persons, border management and sharing of information and training workshops. All countries have either signed an MoU or a bilateral (labour) agreement with another country, making the bilateral level a very formalized dimension of international cooperation on migration. In addition, in 90 per cent of the countries, bilateral migration negotiations, discussions or consultations are ongoing with corresponding origin or destination countries. Two thirds (67%) of the countries assessed in the MGI are also part of regional agreements that promote labour mobility.

<sup>19</sup> The no response rate to this question was 8.

<sup>20</sup> See <https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/migration-data-sources>.

<sup>21</sup> MoUs are non-binding agreements that are easier to negotiate and implement than more formal agreements.

### 3.3.2. Processes

Legal frameworks are not the only way States exchange and cooperate with other countries on migration. Not every country seeks to join a regional free movement arrangement, but all sampled countries have chosen to participate in one or more **Regional Consultative Process (RCP)**.<sup>22</sup> Those processes offer a venue for discussing migration issues, exchanging information, providing technical assistance and capacity development and conducting pilot projects with countries from the same region(s). RCPs can either be based on formal institutions at the regional level or be informal and non-binding. It seems that the countries studied appreciate the high degree of flexibility that RCPs provide.

Even though all countries studied are part of RCPs, arrangements for formal intraregional mobility that have been achieved as a result are just reported for 43 per cent of the countries. Other regional agreements exist on free movement, which may not have been linked to RCPs as discussed above.

Probably the most extensive global consultative process is the informal, State-led Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) that takes place annually since 2007. Almost all MGI countries participate in the GFMD, with only one country being an observer.

#### 3.3.3. Processes and institutional set-up for involving non-State actors

Cooperation and engagement also include different non-State actors. The ones most directly linked to migration are migrants themselves. Those emigrants or descendants of migrants that aim at retaining a link with their country of origin are usually referred to as diaspora members (IOM, 2019:47), who however are not necessarily the same as all citizens leaving a country. Countries with large numbers of emigrants (used as a proxy for diaspora members as information on the latter is not easily available) tend to formally engage members of diaspora communities in agenda setting and implementation of their national development policy. Of the countries, 23 per cent<sup>23</sup> do not engage diaspora communities in this regard, including some countries where emigration outnumbers immigration.

In addition to the institution responsible for operationalizing emigration (see section 3.2.2 above), governments may facilitate **diaspora contributions** to the development of their country through a dedicated institution. Over half (57%) of the MGI countries tasked an institution or body with coordinating efforts to engage with its diaspora population; 14 per cent of them engage it semi-formally in a limited way (only with a select, closed list of individuals) or on an ad hoc basis, while 29 per cent do not have an institution that coordinates efforts with the diaspora. This type of engagement could take the form of providing incentives to attract diaspora members to return to the country of origin and make contributions as development actors and who could be granted various tax and custom duties exemptions, which could be called diaspora integration mechanism (cf. Gamlen, 2008). Some governments host periodical meetings or conferences for their diaspora communities abroad, informing them on issues of social security and other topics of relevance to citizens living abroad, which Gamlen (2008) referred to as diaspora-building mechanism by recognizing those communities. Other countries created dedicated departments in respective ministries for this purpose. It is interesting to note that not only countries with large numbers of emigrants engage with their diaspora members but also some countries that are at the same time hosting an important number of immigrants.

In addition, 47 per cent of the MGI countries formally engage members of diaspora communities in agenda setting and implementation of development policy, while another 32 per cent do so partially. The majority of MGI countries also involve **civil society organizations** in agenda setting and operationalizing migration: 61 per cent engage NGOs formally, while a third does so to some extent, either semi-formally, in a limited way in terms of numbers of organizations consulted or on an ad hoc basis, such as only once or twice in the past. Of the MGI countries, 6 per cent did not engage any civil society organizations in the migration policy development or implementation process.

As concerns the **private sector**, governments formally involve businesses, unions, recruitment agents and other pertinent actors considerably less than civil society (41% versus 61%). Almost half of the countries involve the private sector in a

<sup>22</sup> "State-led, ongoing, regional information-sharing and policy dialogues dedicated to discussing specific migration issue(s) in a cooperative manner among States from an agreed (usually geographical) region, and may either be officially associated with formal regional institutions, or be informal and non-binding." (IOM, 2019:172)

<sup>23</sup> The no-response rate for this indicator was eight countries.

limited way, and 10 per cent do not interact with the private sector at all in migration-related policy processes. That means that the role of NGOs in migration governance is more institutionalized than the links with the private sector, and that governments engage with employers and other private sector agencies more informally.

### 3.4. DOMAIN 4: WELL-BEING OF MIGRANTS

Dimension 4 of the MGI addresses the work of governments to advance the socioeconomic well-being of migrants and society, which is a result of safeguarding particularly socioeconomic rights of migrants. The domain features issues, such as labour migration policies and programmes, promotion of gender equality for immigrants in the workforce and ethical recruitment practices. Indicators in this dimension also focus on the recognition of educational and professional qualifications of immigrants and provisions regulating student migration. Furthermore, reducing the transaction costs for remittances is an important part of this dimension.

#### 3.4.1. Student and labour migration

Over half (55%) of the countries do not have an existing defined programme to manage the immigration of workers into the country. One in five (22%) has a programme such as adjusting visa awards based on labour market demand, and the same share<sup>24</sup> has a partially defined programme to **manage labour immigration**, meaning that labour market demands have translated into policy development in the past in a country or this happens on an ad hoc basis, for instance, to attract certain skills in demand or immigrants for occupations in sectors identified as a priority. Some countries apply quotas on the number of labour migrants that can come into the country, sometimes by occupation or skill level. Bilateral labour agreements are an important vehicle for labour migration. MGI data on them is discussed under dimension 3 above (section 3.3).

Two out of five (41%) MGI countries developed measures that promote **ethical recruitment for immigrants**, and almost the same number of countries (37%) has ad hoc or partial measures to ensure that no labour migrant is exposed

to forced labour, extreme working conditions, undue recruitment fees or earnings below the minimum wage. Countries that do not have any specific policies on ethical recruitment in place include some destination countries in the Global South that may face emigration of highly educated nationals and/or nationals seeking university education abroad. At the same time, only two of the countries studied conduct an assessment on the impact of emigration on the domestic labour market. Therefore, countries of origin do not seem to assess the implications of emigration, particularly those of highly skilled persons, often referred to as “brain drain”, on society. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that in many cases, emigrants are able to access higher education in destination countries, thus acquiring critical skills abroad (without the origin country losing them) and sometimes returning to countries of origin with these competencies.

The **recognition of qualifications** is an important tool to avoid underemployment of skilled immigrants. Over half of the countries in the MGI sample have formalized criteria for recognizing foreign qualifications for most professions, while an additional quarter of countries has such criteria in place for some professions only. Therefore, three out of four MGI countries have formal measures in place to ease immigration of skilled migrants by recognizing their degrees, skills and competencies.


As concerns **international students** that study in a foreign university, almost four out of five MGI countries do not have a scheme allowing international students to work in their country after graduation. Some countries make exceptions by allowing foreign students to remain in the country if they find employment, or providing extensions to their residence permit for some time after graduation for the purpose of seeking employment relevant to their field of study, and then they can then change their visa status. International students do not get preferential access to the job market in many MGI countries and are required to go through the usual work permit procedures even if they acquired their skills in the country. Only in a third of the MGI countries are international students allowed to work during the course of study, which can be an important way to enable less-wealthy immigrants to finance their studies abroad.

<sup>24</sup> Figures are rounded, so the total may not add up to 100 per cent.

### 3.4.2. Migrant remittances

The money that migrants send to their families, relatives and friends can constitute an important contribution to human development in their countries of origin. Nevertheless, scholars have highlighted that they can increase inequality among those receiving these so-called remittances and those households that do not, since the poorest individuals may not be able to migrate in the first place.

Almost half of the MGI countries are actively involved in promoting the creation of formal remittance schemes, such as the G20 Plan to Facilitate Remittance Flows.<sup>25</sup> However, the **average costs of sending remittances** remain higher than the SDG Target 10.c of less than 3 per cent of the amount remitted in most countries. In fact, remittances costs are more than 7 per cent of the amount remitted in 37 per cent of the countries, between 3 and 7 per cent in 49 per cent of the countries and less than 3 per cent in 12 per cent of the countries (see infographic below).<sup>26</sup>



<sup>25</sup> The Group of Twenty (G20) has committed to reducing the global average of remittance transfer costs to 5 per cent, supporting national initiatives and fostering financial inclusion and development through remittances (see [www.gpfi.org/sites/gpfi/files/documents/g20\\_plan\\_facilitate\\_remittance\\_flows.pdf](http://www.gpfi.org/sites/gpfi/files/documents/g20_plan_facilitate_remittance_flows.pdf)).

<sup>26</sup> According to World Bank data for the first quarter of 2019, the global average of remittance transfer costs is 6.94 per cent, or just under 7 per cent. Transfer costs in 63 per cent of countries in the MGI sample are lower or equal to 7 per cent, and thus seem to be lower than the world average (see [https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/rpw\\_report\\_march\\_2019.pdf](https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/rpw_report_march_2019.pdf)). There are no data for one MGI country. It should also be noted that most of the information here is based on World Bank data for the respective countries, but often only based on one remittance corridor when this were the only data available.



About three out of five countries provide some sort of incentives for emigrants to return, such as tax breaks, low-cost bank loans, counselling, training and scholarships. However, once migrants return, many may lose their social benefits paid over many years or even decades (see domain 1 in section 3.1).

### 3.5. DOMAIN 5: THE MOBILITY DIMENSIONS OF CRISES

This dimension of IOM's MiGOF includes both displacement due to conflict and disasters and the relationship between migration, environment and climate change. This domain studies the type and level of preparedness when countries are faced with these events. The indicators aim at identifying the processes in place for nationals and non-nationals both during and after disasters, including whether humanitarian assistance is equally available to migrants as it is to citizens. Overall, this is the least developed MiGOF dimension among MGI countries, with about half of the countries not having considered migrants and displaced persons in the context of crises, but with important variations across countries and regions. This could be linked to the dimension possibly being more relevant for some countries than others.

It is worth noting that 24 per cent of MGI countries do not have any of the following three elements of policies to deal with the mobility dimensions of crises:

- A strategy with specific measures to provide assistance to immigrants during humanitarian and disaster-induced crisis and post-crisis phases in the country;
- A national disaster risk reduction strategy with specific provisions for addressing the displacement impacts of disasters; and
- The inclusion of human mobility considerations into recovery strategies, meaning the needs of migrants are integrated in such frameworks.

Looking at the first of these three points, over half (55%) of the countries do not report having an explicit strategy with **specific measures in providing assistance to immigrants during crisis and post-crisis** phases in the country. 22 per cent have such a strategy, while an additional 22 per cent had one in the past (usually in the context of a specific crisis), but it has not been updated in the past 10 years. In some countries, even though there is no strategy in place,

governments provide assistance for immigrants in need on an ad hoc basis.

Almost half (45%) of the governments do not have a **national disaster risk reduction strategy with specific provisions for addressing the displacement impacts of disasters**; 37 per cent have such a strategy, while an additional 18 per cent had one in the past (usually in the context of a specific crisis), but it has not been updated in the past 10 years. Some countries have national strategies with provisions for addressing displacement in the case of one or more types of disasters.

In addition, 24 per cent of the countries **include migration issues into recovery strategies**, with another 31 per cent having some consideration of migrant issues, but with no plan of action; and 45 per cent of the countries do not include migration issues into recovery strategies.

Over half (51%) the countries do not have **strategies for addressing migratory movements caused by environmental degradation and the adverse effects of climate change** in place. Of the countries, 18 per cent have such a strategy, while an additional 31 per cent have a strategy, but it has not been updated in the last 10 years.

The MGI database shows a different trend when it comes to **planning for large inflows or outflows of people**. In fact, more than three out of four MGI countries have planned for large-scale population movements in times of crises (49% have a contingency plan in place, and 27% have an outdated one, which means it has not been updated in the past decade). Almost a quarter (24%) of the countries do not have any plans in place. Some countries only have contingency plans for specific populations such as during a refugee inflow, but not for internal displacement.

**Assistance to nationals living abroad who find themselves in situations of crisis** is an area that is well developed for most MGI countries, which is not surprising since it is probably one of the core functions of foreign services. Two thirds of the countries provide consular assistance to nationals living in countries caught up in crises, and an additional 31 per cent do so partially, meaning that they assist their nationals on an ad hoc basis, especially when a new crisis emerges. One country in the sample does not provide these services.

In case a sudden environmental event or conflict breaks out within a country, 71 per cent of MGI countries take **the specific vulnerabilities that immigrants face** into consideration when communicating about a crisis and how to receive assistance, and 14 per cent do so to a limited extent. The main languages used to communicate in times of crises tend to be the official national languages, which can thus hinder immigrants' understanding of vital information. Some countries do provide it in more than one language.

The majority of MGI countries streamline their **immigration procedures for migrants in times of crises** (55%). These exceptions and simplifications to the immigration procedures for immigrants whose country of origin is experiencing crisis often focus on refugees and asylum seekers. Some countries allow such immigrants to obtain humanitarian visas. A third of the countries make partial exceptions to immigration procedures, which includes ad hoc measures, and 12 per cent has no such provisions for immigrants whose country of origin is experiencing crisis. Thus, in addition to admitting refugees and asylum seekers, most countries also react to unforeseen and large crisis movements with specific exceptional measures.

**Reintegration after the return of migrants that fled during a crisis** is an underdeveloped area of migration governance. Of the countries in the MGI sample, 27 per cent are implementing strategies or policies to promote the sustainable reintegration of emigrants, such as through the protection of assets and entitlements. Examples include providing assistance to IDPs upon return, such as through the restoration of destroyed houses and compensation for damages of those households affected by environmental degradation. Leaving a country of destination that is affected by a crisis can also affect the residency privileges of immigrants in certain circumstances. Another approach constitutes considering exceptional circumstances, such as crises as an exception for withdrawing residency permits for immigrants who leave the country, but informing the authorities in the destination country where they hold a residency permit.


### 3.6. DOMAIN 6: SAFE, ORDERLY AND REGULAR MIGRATION

Dimension 6 of the MGI concerns ensuring that migration takes place in a safe, orderly and regular manner. A rights-based approach can be a sustainable and holistic way to promote safe, orderly and regular migration based on State sovereignty. Indicators in this domain analyse border control aspects of migration governance, the availability of information on visa options for prospective immigrants, measures to combat human trafficking and smuggling of migrants, as well as assessing whether countries have systems in place to trace and identify migrants that went missing or died while moving abroad. The dimension also deals with efforts and incentives to help integrate returning citizens.

In terms of **managing borders**, all but 16 per cent of MGI countries have one fully dedicated or several bodies tasked with different aspects of integrated border control and security. Some countries have several entities focusing on border management, for instance, with one body focusing on maritime security and border control and a second focusing on entry via airports. All but a few countries also provide training to border staff – most of them regularly (in 55% of countries), some of them on an ad hoc basis (37%) – including on foreign language skills to communicate with immigrants, and gender and cultural aspects working with nationals of other countries. Some countries have two types of border agents – the police and subcontractors – who do not receive the same level of training, which could pose a challenge for both the contractors and immigrants arriving.

The **provision of clearly outlined information on legal entry categories** is an important step to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration. Two countries in the MGI sample do not have a website clearly outlining visa options. Some countries only provide this information in one language, while others do so in up to 12 languages, which can facilitate access for many different immigrant groups. All but one country allows for formal visa application processes prior to arrival for immigrants: 31 per cent have a fully online process, 43 per cent a mix between online and paper-based systems, and 22 per cent are only paper-based, thus increasing transaction costs for migrants who have to submit them in person at consulates. In one country, visas can only be obtained upon arrival.

## FORMAL VISA APPLICATION PROCESSES PRIOR TO ARRIVAL FOR IMMIGRANTS



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Almost half of the countries assessed (47%) do not have a **formal programme or policy on facilitating migrant reintegration** in their country of origin for citizens who formerly emigrated. Slightly more than a quarter (27%) have a government programme or policy in place providing support to emigrants wishing to return to their origin country, and about the same amount of countries devised a partial approach, such as a programme with a limited set of initiatives and/or only accessible to some returning migrants (such as from specific countries or meeting specific vulnerability criteria).

Ensuring safe migration entails efforts to **combat human trafficking and smuggling of migrants**. As concerns institutional structures, all but four countries have an agency or strategy to address

trafficking in persons and labour exploitation. In some countries, several agencies are involved. In addition to institutional structures, several countries have specific policies, strategies or national action plans to end human trafficking. In terms of sharing information on those programmes, fewer countries do so regularly (41% on a quarterly or annual basis; 29% of countries publish data but not regularly or only a limited amount of information). As concerns smuggling of migrants, a minority of countries have formal cooperation agreements or arrangements with other countries to prevent and counter-smuggling.<sup>27</sup> The eight countries that are members of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime – an RCP established in 2002 – address practical issues related to those topics in this forum.

<sup>27</sup> This indicator was added in round 4 of the MGI, so only 10 countries were assessed.

Another indicator for which only 10 countries were assessed concerns the minimization **of risks for all migrants**, in particular those in transit towards an international destination and/or at the national border, regardless of legal status. Five of the ten countries assessed on this question have such measures in place, and a further three have partial policies on reducing risks in place. Such procedures may include operating and maintaining child protection units, training police and border personnel to identify trafficking in human being cases, and providing in-kind support to NGOs working in the field of counter-trafficking.

Migration can lead to death while en route to destination. This could be due to accidents (for instance on roads, rails or vessels), criminal acts or deterioration of previous or new health conditions. Some migrants are particularly vulnerable to the risk of harm or death en route, regardless of their migration status. Victims of trafficking, who may be travelling on valid visas, can be extra vulnerable to criminal acts; people smugglers often gravely

risk the safety of the people they smuggle across borders; regular migrants of limited means may have no choice but to take dangerous routes or overcrowded, poorly maintained means of transport. Migrants may lose contact with their families, friends and relatives, on purpose or without, which can be a desperate situation for those staying behind and not knowing about the whereabouts of their family members. Upholding the rights to life, freedom from torture and inhumane or degrading treatment are key to ensure migration is safe. For the ten countries where this indicator was added, only two countries have a national system in place and formal cooperation arrangements with other countries to **trace and identify missing migrants** within their national territory, and another two have a partial system, meaning having either a national system in place or cooperating with other countries but not both.

After presenting the results of the data in this chapter, chapter 4 will discuss these findings and certain typologies that emerge.

## 4. SUMMARY OF MAIN RESULTS

This section showcases three different ways in which the MGI findings can be analysed. The first focuses on the global development framework, namely how the MGI can inform progress towards the achievement of SDG goals and targets. Secondly, the chapter presents the key results by the six MiGOF domains; and thirdly, how the findings can be grouped into an approach based on the following: (a) comprehensiveness of covering immigration and emigration; (b) focus on development, human rights and/or security/control; or (c) by sector (rule of law, international cooperation, economic migration to name a few).

### 4.1. MIGRATION GOVERNANCE INDICATORS AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

The development of the MGI came as a response to the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in September 2015. For the first time, migration and migrants featured as key enablers of sustainable development in the international agenda. Migration is mentioned under various goals including those on ensuring education for all, reducing the costs of remittances, eradicating human trafficking and upholding labour migrants' human rights.

Most importantly, SDG Target 10.7 calls for governments to “facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies”.<sup>28</sup> This target recognizes that if countries want to ensure that migration becomes safer, more orderly and more regular, they ought to have an introspective look at the policies, strategies and institutional

arrangements they have in place to manage migration, and ensure that they adequately respond to the challenges and opportunities stemming from migration in their specific national context.

While 10.7 sets a specific target to make migration safer, more orderly and more regular, it should also be considered in relation to all other migration-related aspects of the SDGs. For instance, governments wishing to develop well-managed migration policies will have to consider the following: (a) how migrants are included in their health policies (SDG 3); (b) how migrants are included in their education systems (SDG 4); (c) how gender considerations are included in migration policies (SDG 5); or (d) how migration and displacement are included in disaster risk reduction strategies.

In this regard, the relationship between the MGI and the SDGs is twofold: (a) the MGI is a tool that can help countries assess where they stand in their efforts to achieve progress on SDG targets, in particular 10.7;<sup>29</sup> and (b) it can help assess whether countries are also meeting other targets such as reducing remittance transaction costs, recruitment costs and trafficking and disaggregating data.

In particular, the MGI is relevant to a wide range of SDGs:<sup>30</sup>

#### SDG 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere

MGI data show that 80 per cent of countries are providing equal access to social protection for some categories of migrants (SDG 1.3), with 33 per cent providing equal access to migrants, irrespective of their migratory status. In addition, 53 per cent of governments have agreements with one or more other countries on portability of social security

<sup>28</sup> Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, SDG Target 10.7.

<sup>29</sup> The MGI is in line with the UN Inquiry on Population and Development collecting data for indicator 10.7.2 on the “number of countries with migration policies to facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people”. Both are using IOM’s MiGOF as a working definition for the concept of “well-managed migration policies”.

<sup>30</sup> The MGI is relevant to other SDGs not covered in the list below. For instance, gender (SDG 5) is mainstreamed to the extent possible in several MGI questions.

entitlements and earned benefits, including old-age pensions (with an additional 18% having partial agreements).

With regards to building the resilience of those in vulnerable situations (SDG 1.5), the majority (55%) of MGI countries did not have a strategy with specific measures in providing assistance to immigrants during crisis and post-crisis phases in the country. Similarly, 45 per cent of countries did not have a national disaster risk reduction strategy with specific provisions for addressing the displacement impacts of disasters.

### **SDG 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages**

SDG Target 3.8 calls for States to achieve universal health coverage. The MGI assessment can help set a baseline with regards to health coverage for immigrants, as 43 per cent of participating countries provide health coverage to all immigrants regardless of their migratory status.

### **SDG 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all**

SDG Target 4.1 seeks to ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes. In the vast majority of countries (79%), not all immigrants, regardless of their migratory status, have equal access to education as nationals. Regarding tertiary and vocational education (SDGs 4.3 and 4.4), the majority of countries (78%) do not have schemes to retain international students in the country after graduation, whereas roughly half of them (51%) allow or partially allow international students to work during their studies.

### **SDG 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all**

SDG 8.5 promotes full and productive employment for all. Among MGI countries, 33 per cent allow migrants' access to public sector employment with the only restriction being the exercise of public authority and safeguarding general State interests.

This proportion increases when looking at access to private sector employment, where there are no additional restrictions beyond those based on the type of permit mentioned for 57 per cent. For 41 per cent of the countries, all categories of foreign residents have equal access to self-employment as nationals.

With regards to ethical recruitment and the respect of labour migrants' rights (SDG 8.7 and 8.8), 78 per cent of countries have put in place measures to some extent to ensure the ethical recruitment of migrants, and 88 per cent of countries have mechanisms in full or partly to protect the rights of their nationals working abroad.

Furthermore, 92 per cent have an agency or strategy in place to combat human trafficking (SDG 8.7), and around 70 per cent of countries publish data in this regard.

### **SDG 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries**

In an effort to encourage safer, more orderly and regular migration (SDG 10.7), 94 per cent of countries have established bilateral labour agreements; 84 per cent of countries have some kind of system in place to monitor visa overstays, 76 per cent of countries have a dedicated body tasked with integrated border control and security, and 96 per cent of countries have websites clearly or partially outlining the types of visas and opportunities for migration. However, these websites are not always available in a language that immigrants would understand.

With regards to remittances (SDG 10.c), the average cost of sending remittance to or from the country is less than 3 per cent for 6 countries, between 3 and 7 per cent for 24 countries and more than 7 per cent for 18 countries.<sup>31</sup> One country did not respond. A majority of MGI countries (63%) have formal remittance schemes in place, or at least to some extent. However, among the 10 responses, only a minority of them (4 countries) have some kind of programme to promote the financial inclusion of migrants and their families, particularly when they are remittance senders and/or receivers.

<sup>31</sup> Due to the constantly evolving prices and the lack of availability of data for many migration corridors, this assessment was done based on data that was available during the assessment. See also footnote 31 above for more limitations.

## **SDG 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable**

While the pilot of the local MGI assessment (see section 5.2.1: Local Migration Governance Indicators) provides more information on the role of cities in contributing to the achievement of migration-related aspects of the SDGs, several MGI questions are relevant to SDG 11.

For instance, SDG Target 11.5 calls for the reduction of the number of people negatively affected by disasters through better protection of vulnerable populations. Almost all MGI countries (98%) have some measures to assist their nationals living abroad in times of crisis.

As for migrants residing in the country, 28 per cent of countries provide assistance adapted to the special needs of immigrants (although at times in a limited way). Furthermore, the majority (88%) of countries have some kind of measure in place to make exceptions to the immigration procedures for immigrants whose country of origin is experiencing crisis.<sup>32</sup>

## **SDG 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels**

The SDGs promote the development of effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels (SDG 16.6). In this respect, 67 per cent of countries have an agency responsible for designing and coordinating the implementation of an overall migration policy or strategic plan. Such a strategic plan exists and is updated on a regular basis in 55 per cent of MGI countries assessed.

In roughly half of the countries that have participated in the MGI (50%),<sup>33</sup> there is an interministerial body that meets on a regular basis to discuss migration issues. Furthermore, the majority of countries (57%) has a government entity responsible for engaging with diaspora members and an additional 14 per cent has a partial set-up.

## **SDG 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development**

Finally, SDG 17.18 calls for better data disaggregated by migratory status, and 61 per cent of countries that have information available on this indicator in the MGI include migration questions in their national census, with an additional 15 per cent doing so partially. Outside of this census, 50 per cent of countries in our sample publish migration data on a regular basis. Of the 21 countries that responded, 8 countries disaggregate their migration data by sex, with another 7 countries doing so partially.

## **4.2. MAIN FINDINGS BY MIGOF DIMENSION**

An overview of the MGI data is presented in chapter 3 and organized around the six domains of IOM's MiGOF: migrants' rights, "whole-of-government" approach, partnerships, well-being of migrants, mobility dimensions of crises, and safe, orderly and regular migration.

Governance frameworks on migrants' rights vary considerably among the countries studied. The data show that many countries provide access to social services and protection, family reunification and employment (except for the public sector) for immigrants, but often depending on the legal status of the non-nationals. The right to vote is often granted to a country's own nationals residing abroad. Immigrants can often not vote in local elections. There is an increasing trend of enfranchising foreign residents in local elections in certain regions,<sup>34</sup> such as in the case of the European Union and South America (Ceriani Cernadas and Freier, 2015:24–25).

In terms of a "whole-of-government" approach, the codification of immigration legislation, institutions and processes is more advanced than the corresponding governance of emigration, which is noteworthy since many of the MGI countries have (even if often slightly) higher numbers of emigrants than immigrants (see chapter 2.3: Methodology). From a human rights perspective, the advanced state of immigration legislation compared to emigration can be explained by the fact that States have the sovereign right to decide who can enter and reside on their territory, while individuals have the human right to leave any country, including their own (Perruchoud, 2012:130). However, this does not explain why fewer countries have diaspora institutions and outreach processes in place. Many countries are also lacking a migration strategy and

<sup>32</sup> Refugee-related policies are not considered exceptions to immigration procedures.

<sup>33</sup> No data are available for three countries.

<sup>34</sup> See <http://globalcit.eu/national-electoral-laws/>.

have not fully aligned the migration policy with the development approach. The evidence base of migration governance is relatively well-developed, with most countries collecting information on migrants (both immigrants and emigrants) in one form or another.

Partnerships constitute the most advanced dimension among all six, highlighting the importance of cooperation with other countries in managing migration. In particular, at the bilateral level many arrangements exist. The regional level is also well developed with regards to agreements and in particular RCPs but not as universally as at the bilateral level. Civil society is integrated well in policymaking process consultations, while outreach to the private sector is less developed overall, possibly because from a policy perspective, governments treat migration primarily as a security matter to be dealt with by ministries of interior/home affairs rather than as an economic matter.

Governance aspects concerning the well-being of migrants, such as a labour migration policy, ethical recruitment measures and the recognition of qualifications are unevenly in place across countries. Advances in reducing the transaction costs of remittances are notable, partially due to global commitments on this matter,<sup>35</sup> but international targets have not been fully reached.

As noted earlier, the DEMIG project at Oxford University, in a review of policy changes in 54 countries, found that migration policies had become increasingly selective. In the MGI sample of 49 countries, only 11 of them (about 1 in 5) conduct a national assessment for monitoring labour market demand for immigrants. A number of other countries evaluate the needs of employers and companies regarding professions and skills needed, but do not aim to fill them with immigrant labour (but rather encourage training of more nationals in these sectors). Most countries (two thirds) do not have different visa types for attracting immigrants with specific labour skills, but three out of five fully (33%) or partially (29%) account for labour migrants' skills and capabilities when deciding whether to admit them, for instance in point-based systems. Thus, a review of the MGI countries confirms the trend of increasing selectiveness of immigrants by skill level, which potentially leaves less legal pathways for lower skilled immigrants.

The mobility dimensions of crises, both in terms of conflict and environmental degradation and disasters, is the domain with probably the greatest potential for further development across countries. Few countries have integrated the specific vulnerabilities of immigrants in crisis and post-crisis policy frameworks, as well as in their national disaster risk reduction, recovery and related strategies. However, communication channels are more developed when it comes to reaching out to immigrants, as well when the country faces a crisis. Support to nationals abroad that may be caught in a crisis situation is far more developed in the MGI countries than other aspects, as are immigration policy changes to allow foreigners affected by a crisis abroad to enter the country. Thus, the focus tends to be on assisting migrants (emigrants) caught in crises in other countries than in the countries (that may be affected by a crisis) as destinations themselves.

Ensuring that migration takes place in a safe, regular and orderly manner is a fairly advanced domain in the MGI countries. The majority has a border agency and shares information on visa and other options. Most countries also have an agency, strategy or plan to end trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, although information may not always be updated and readily available on those programmes. An area for improvement is reintegration policies for nationals who had emigrated and are returning in whichever way and coordination on identifying and tracing missing migrants.

### 4.3. ANALYSIS OF MAIN FINDINGS BY FOCUS AND APPROACH

In addition to the SDGs and MiGOF dimensions, there are other ways to look at the MGI data and classify indicators. Besides the unique insights on institutions and governance processes (including coordination), the main strength of the MGI database from an analytical perspective lies in the **comprehensiveness** of the database. This subsection provides insights based on the fact that the MGI looks at governance aspects that relate to immigration, emigration as well as both, and it delves deep into migrants' rights, the links between migration and human development, as well as migration and security understood as immigration border control and other control aspects. While the MGI does not go into details on every aspect of

<sup>35</sup> For example, at the global level: paragraph 40 of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda; SDG Target 10.c.



migration governance, it also offers an overview on key sectors of migration governance, such as rule of law, policy coherence, international cooperation, economic migration, integration policy and crisis and disaster management. This subsection provides an analysis of these issues in more detail.

First, the MGI database includes 39 indicators that are mostly relevant to immigration governance, 10 indicators that are centred on emigration, and 32 indicators that are relevant to both. In 37 out of the 49 MGI countries, the highest percentage of “yes” answers among the three options (focus on immigration, emigration or both) – which is taken as an indication that the governance area is the most developed – is related to indicators that are applicable to both, signalling that migration governance frameworks in most countries cover both immigration and emigration aspects. This comprehensiveness shows the importance of analysing national migration governance frameworks in a holistic way – as the MGI does – rather than simply focusing on either immigration or emigration, because many aspects of the governance of immigration and emigration are interrelated. There is no country where immigration-related indicators show the highest percentage of “yes” answers; the remaining 12 countries with the highest percentage of “yes” responses for indicators related exclusively to emigration are all characterized by negative net migration rates, which means that the focus of their migration governance reflects the fact that emigration is more prevalent in their country than immigration.

A second way in which MGI indicators can be categorized relates to whether they are linked to rights-based (28 indicators), development-oriented (21) and security-centred (13 indicators) aspects of migration governance. Among those three approaches, the aspect of migration governance that tends to be most developed in the MGI countries is its **security aspect** (30 out of 49 countries have most “yes” answers for security-related indicators). **Development-oriented** indicators are the most developed in 12 countries, **rights-based** indicators in 5, while 2 countries have equally developed rights and development aspects and rights and security aspects respectively. Four of the five (80%) countries where rights-based aspects of migration governance are the most developed are characterized by negative net migration rates, meaning that they have more emigrants than

immigrants. It could be argued that since these countries host fewer immigrants, they are more generous with immigrants, but if this number was to increase, restrictions would also increase. At the same time, the number of emigrants – or an almost equal number of emigrants – compared to immigrants could mean that these destination countries have an interest in establishing a reciprocity of treatment.

A third angle for further analysis of the database is to look at thematic areas for migration governance and their relative development. The MGI includes the following number of indicators per thematic area:

- Rule of law (10)
- Policy coherence (8)
- Cooperation/partnerships (23)
- Economic migration (including labour migration) (9)
- Migrant integration (14)
- Crisis/disasters management (11)

As also highlighted in the analysis by MiGOF dimension (see chapter 3.3, Domain 3: Partnerships), the thematic area that is relatively most developed in the highest number of countries is **cooperation/partnerships**, with 18 countries. This may reflect the fact that migration in an inherently cross-border topic for which cooperation among States at the bilateral, regional and global level and a whole-of-society approach is not only important, but also necessary. The second most developed set of indicators relates to efforts to ensure **policy coherence** (17 countries). While no terms of comparison for the situation of MGI countries a few years ago is available, it is likely that these efforts reflect a growing interest in and awareness on the importance of policy coherence and the need for a whole-of-government approach. In fact, an analysis of the qualitative data contained in MGI assessments (the justification sections for the indicators) in these countries shows that in many cases, IOM is in fact supporting these efforts. The **rule of law** is the most developed area in 11 countries, and the other areas are the most developed in four countries in total.

The next section will look at remaining data gaps, recent developments in the field of migration governance, and will conclude with some policy reflections.



## 5. WAY FORWARD

### 5.1. IMPLICATIONS FOR MIGRATION GOVERNANCE

Studying the results discussed in chapter 4, a few key issues of relevance for policymakers stand out. It is important to approach the topic of migration comprehensively, to mainstream migration into other policy areas and for the potential of developing capacities in certain areas of migration governance where gaps are identified.

After outlining these policy implications, this concluding chapter sketches new developments in the MGI framework, as well as the remaining data gaps on national migration governance.

#### 5.1.1. A holistic approach to migration governance involves both immigration and emigration

The experience with the MGI approach has shown that countries often focus on immigration and emigration. Almost all countries are both a destination of immigrants and have nationals that emigrated (and may as well be countries of transit). A perspective is needed that recognizes immigrants are another country's emigrants and vice versa, and have something to contribute to both their country of origin and destination. For policies to be comprehensive and effective in the long term, both aspects need to be taken into consideration, even in traditional immigration or emigration countries respectively. Otherwise, immigrants may face the same challenge of a country's emigrants in the country itself. The same applies to emigrants from a more traditional immigration country, who may also need support, including upon return (see also section 5.1.3: Potential for further development of capacities). Migration trends also tend to change over time, so governments should be aware of their changing migration trends and their implications for policy, institutions and processes, and be prepared for a changing migration landscape.

#### 5.1.2. The need to mainstream migration into other policy areas

Migration often remains a **policy silo**, despite this point having been made in the migration policy literature for a few years now and being increasingly recognized in the respective global frameworks (see chapter 1). However, human mobility affects and is linked to many other areas and as such, needs to be mainstreamed into other policies at the national level. **In particular, sustainable development, disasters and climate change** are key concerns for many countries with existing commitments at the global level and require alignment with policies and other aspects of migration governance, such as institutions and processes, at the national level. Furthermore, ethical recruitment of migrants, recognition of foreign qualifications and reduction of remittance costs stand out in terms of development concerns, and consideration of the impacts on migrants in all disaster and climate change policies is a very important step towards effective policies in these fields, as well as the protection of migrants themselves.

#### 5.1.3. Potential for further development of capacities

This report indicated a number of potential areas where capacities to govern migration can be developed further. Aspects that stand out among others as relatively less developed are the following:

- **Including migration-related questions in census** questionnaires or using and understanding administrative data to ensure an adequate evidence base for policies;
- Developing a **coherent overall national migration strategy and policy**;
- Focusing on **engaging the private sector** in migration policymaking processes, given the importance of companies for the development of policies to incentivize legal

employment. The private sector's diverse industries and interests means they can be better engaged in migrant-related policies;

- Developing **strategies for reintegration of returning migrants**, such as providing programmatic support in the form of finding employment, financial literacy seminars, loan facilities, possible training and in-country counselling could be developed further in many contexts; and
- **Tracing and identifying missing migrants**,<sup>36</sup> especially given the importance of SDG Target 10.7. on facilitating safe migration. The most fundamental way to make migration safe is by saving lives and thus protecting the human right to life.

## 5.2. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Since 2015, 50 countries have conducted assessments of their migration policies using the MGI, and States have recognized the effectiveness of the MGI in identifying existing practices and gaps, as well as establishing priorities. In recent years, a number of countries have used the MGI assessment to inform the development of new or adapted national migration policies and strategies. Furthermore, some countries have been using the MGI to report to the High-level Political Forum on the progress they have made to improve their migration policies, in line with SDG 10.7. Finally, different countries are considering the results of the MGI assessments when devising their United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDFs).

Building on this success, IOM decided to develop two initiatives to further strengthen the impact of the tool and its usefulness to Member States: the Local MGI and the Migration Governance policy elements.

### 5.2.1. Local Migration Governance Indicators

The Local MGI, launched in July 2018, emerged from the interest of IOM Member States in a corresponding city-level MGI initiative, as in many countries a comprehensive picture of migration governance can only be captured by looking at different levels of government.

Like its national equivalent, the Local MGI is based on a set of about 90 indicators helping local authorities take stock of local migration strategies or initiatives in place, and identifying ongoing practices, as well as areas with potential for further development. The aim of the exercise is to foster the dialogue on migration between national governments and local authorities, as well as enable local authorities to learn from one another by discussing common challenges and identifying potential solutions.

While the Local MGI retains the attributes of the National MGI, it is also anchored in the notion that cities have different capacities, competencies and added value when it comes to governing migration. It also recognizes that practices can take different forms depending on the division of competencies between local and national authorities. Local authorities are often in closer contact with migrants themselves, and play a key role in their effective integration.

### 5.2.2. Migration Governance Indicators' policy elements

The development of MGI policy elements, similar to the Local MGI, emerged from the interest of many governments – having participated in the MGI – to start tackling the gaps that have emerged through the initial assessment.

Therefore, in March 2019, IOM started the development of MGI policy elements. These elements will be associated with relevant MGI indicators to help countries take steps in addressing selected policy gaps (for example, a counter-trafficking strategy should have a few key elements of prevention, protection, prosecution and partnerships).

<sup>36</sup> Even though this indicator was only assessed in 10 countries so far, it is an important aspect of ensuring that migration is safe.

The MGI policy elements will help to: (a) formulate priorities; (b) set high-level goals to be achieved, and (c) address gaps identified through the MGI assessment. The MGI policy elements will provide IOM staff with a list of concrete steps to help governments design a specific policy (such as counter-trafficking policy and/or based on evidence) or incorporate migration into an existing one (for example, mainstream migration into the health policy).

### 5.3. DATA GAPS

Multi-country data sets on migration governance usually focus on immigration frameworks and often reflect a geographical bias towards developed destination countries. The data sets display a range in the information they present as the number of countries, years and indicators they cover varies. There are restrictions in terms of access to some of the data, as they are not available to the public. Some of the data sets are initiated as projects but because of funding limitations, they may not be updated regularly or expanded beyond the region of interest. Such issues can limit the comprehensiveness and comparison of data across time. Another weakness of existing migration governance related data sets is that they tend to cover a limited group of countries, in particular the Member States of the OECD. Developing countries are thus underrepresented, which creates a bias, both geographically and in terms of levels of economic development.

The MGI attempts to fill some of these data gaps by taking a comprehensive approach to the issue of migration governance, including countries from both developing and developed countries and covering both immigration and emigration aspects. The MGI also assesses national migration governance frameworks in a comprehensive way by looking at institutions, regulations, coordinating mechanisms and operational structures of the country, thereby making it an effective tool for evidence-based policymaking.

Building on the MGI database, several steps can be taken to fill the remaining data gaps that could complement available data so future research and analysis on migration governance can be improved. First, the current MGI data set only includes 49 countries, and adding more countries in the subsequent rounds of data collection would help build a more complete data set. Additionally, plans to update the information available in the current data set regularly would also ensure that the database is up to date and therefore more easily comparable. This will also allow governments to establish a baseline and monitor their progress over time.

As the role of cities and municipalities are growing in importance in recent decades because of urbanization, local-level data becomes significant. The national level MGI can be complemented with similar assessments at the local level. For instance, the IOM has adapted the MGI to the local level to offer a more comprehensive picture of what is done at all levels of government when it comes to migration (see section 5.2.1: Local Migration Governance Indicators). This local-level data can complement the national-level data on migration governance with practices at the municipal and city levels, especially for the country profiles that track national progress. This would be particularly important for the MGI to more comprehensively look at integration issues as they are addressed mostly at the local level. The national level of migration governance could also be complemented with the regional level, as many of the MiGOF domains are also regulated at the regional level in some regions (for example, the right to vote in local elections).

Similarly, the MGI assessments can also complement migration profiles – which bring together migration data from a wide range of sources – involve consultation with many different actors in an effort to help identify and develop strategies to address data gaps, and produce the evidence required to inform policy and encourage evidence-based migration policymaking. There are migration profiles for about 132 countries around the world, and this information on statistics can complement the information on the MGI for these countries and their migration snapshots.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Similarly to Migration Profiles though, the MGI profiles would need to be updated regularly.

The MGI database can help enhance the understanding of migration governance frameworks worldwide by providing a comprehensive assessment of areas that are relatively more developed in 49 countries worldwide, and areas that need strengthening. MGI assessments gather information on migration governance in all regions of the world, and they take a holistic approach by looking at all key elements of migration governance as defined by IOM: the substantive level, linked to rules, policies, measures and principles; the institutional set-up; and the procedural level.

Nevertheless, this report is only based on 49 countries – a high number, but still less than one third of IOM and UN Member States. The MGI needs to be complemented by studies to offer an in-depth analysis not only of migration governance frameworks from an institutional and procedural perspective, but also from a substantive perspective, particularly looking at outcomes for migrants (for example, how do they compare with nationals on key socioeconomic indicators?) and implementation and impacts of policy.

# ANNEX 1: MGI COUNTRIES BY REGION, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX, NET MIGRATION RATE AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT STOCK

	MGI country by Region <sup>a</sup>	Human Development Index (HDI) value <sup>b</sup>	Net migration rate <sup>c</sup> (2015)	International migrant stock <sup>d</sup> (2017)
<b>Eastern Africa</b>				
1	Djibouti	0.476 (Low human development)	1.4	12.1%
2	Ethiopia	0.463 (Low human development)	-0.1	1.2%
3	Kenya	0.590 (Medium human development)	-0.2	2.2%
4	Mauritius	0.790 (High human development)	-1.9	2.3%
5	Uganda	0.516 (Low human development)	-0.8	3.9%
6	Zambia	0.588 (Medium human development)	-0.5	0.9%
<b>Northern Africa</b>				
7	Morocco	0.667 (Medium human development)	-1.8	0.3%
<b>Southern Africa</b>				
8	Lesotho	0.520 (Low human development)	-2.4	0.3%
9	South Africa	0.699 (Medium human development)	3	7.1%
<b>Western Africa</b>				
10	Côte d'Ivoire	0.492 (Low human development)	0.6	9%
11	Ghana	0.592 (Medium human development)	-0.4	1.4%
12	Guinea-Bissau	0.455 (Low human development)	-1.2	1.3%
13	Mali	0.427 (Low human development)	-3.7	2.1%
14	Mauritania	0.520 (Low human development)	2.1	3.8%
<b>Caribbean</b>				
15	Dominican Republic	0.736 (High human development)	-3	3.9%
16	Jamaica	0.732 (High human development)	-6.5	0.8%
<b>Central America</b>				
17	Costa Rica	0.794 (High human development)	0.8	8.4%
18	El Salvador	0.674 (Medium human development)	-7.7	0.7%
19	Guatemala	0.650 (Medium human development)	-0.6	0.5%
20	Honduras	0.617 (Medium human development)	-0.3	0.4%
21	Mexico	0.774 (High human development)	-0.5	0.9%
22	Panama	0.789 (High human development)	1.5	4.7%
<b>Northern America</b>				
23	Canada	0.926 (Very high human development)	6.5	21.5%
<b>South America</b>				
24	Argentina	0.825 (Very high human development)	0.1	4.9%
25	Brazil	0.759 (High human development)	0	0.4%
26	Colombia	0.747 (High human development)	-0.6	0.3%
27	Ecuador	0.752 (High human development)	-0.5	2.4%
28	Peru	0.750 (High human development)	-1.6	0.3%

	MGI country by Region <sup>a</sup>	Human Development Index (HDI) value <sup>b</sup>	Net migration rate <sup>c</sup> (2015)	International migrant stock <sup>d</sup> (2017)
<b>Central Asia</b>				
29	Kazakhstan	0.800 (Very high human development)	1.9	20%
30	Kyrgyzstan	0.672 (Medium human development)	-4.9	3.3%
<b>Eastern Asia</b>				
31	Republic of Korea	0.903 (Very high human development)	0.7	2.3%
<b>South-Eastern Asia</b>				
32	Philippines	0.699 (Medium human development)	-1.3	0.2%
33	Timor-Leste	0.625 (Medium human development)	-8.5	0.9%
<b>Southern Asia</b>				
34	Bangladesh	0.608 (Medium human development)	-3.2	0.9%
35	Nepal	0.574 (Medium human development)	-2.7	1.7%
36	Sri Lanka	0.770 (High human development)	-4.7	0.2%
<b>Western Asia</b>				
37	Bahrain	0.846 (Very high human development)	6.4	48.4%
38	Kuwait	0.803 (Very high human development)	38.7	75.5%
39	Turkey	0.791 (High human development)	4.3	6%
<b>Eastern Europe</b>				
40	Republic of Moldova	0.700 (High human development)	-0.5	3.5%
41	Ukraine	0.751 (High human development)	-0.9	11.2%
<b>Southern Europe</b>				
42	Albania	0.785 (High human development)	-6.4	1.8%
43	Italy	0.880 (Very high human development)	0.9	10%
44	Portugal	0.847 (Very high human development)	-2.7	8.5%
45	Serbia	0.787 (High human development)	-2.2	9.1%
<b>Northern Europe</b>				
46	Sweden	0.933 (Very high human development)	5.3	17.6%
<b>Western Europe</b>				
47	Germany	0.936 (Very high human development)	4.4	14.8%
<b>Oceania (Melanesia)</b>				
48	Vanuatu	0.603 (Medium human development)	0.5	1.2%
<b>Oceania (Melanesia)</b>				
49	Tuvalu	N/A	N/A	1.3%

Notes: a United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs' (UN DESA) list of geographic regions presents the composition of geographical regions used by the Statistics Division in its publications and databases. Available at <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/> (accessed 30 April 2019).

b The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: (a) a long and healthy life; (b) being knowledgeable; and (c) having a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions. The HDI was created to emphasize that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone. Available at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI>.

c Net migration rate is calculated by the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants over a period, divided by the person-years lived by the population of the receiving country over that period. It is expressed as an average annual number of migrants per 1,000 population (UN DESA, Population Division World Population Prospects 2017, Online edition, available at <https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Migration/> (accessed 30 April 2019)).

d UN DESA, International migrant stock 2017: The 2017 revision. Available at [www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.asp](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.asp).



## ANNEX 2: DETAILS ON THE METHODOLOGY

The matrix of indicators includes the following information for each question in separate columns:

- Category (Migration Governance Framework domain)
- Indicator name
- Rationale (explanation of what the indicators refers to)
- Subindicator (in cases where indicators are broken down into subindicators)
- Question
- Guidance/Definition (for the Economist Intelligence Unit researcher that drafts the matrix)
- Response options
- Response for the country
- Justification for the response chosen
- References (documents, as well as interviews when they help clarify)

As concerns data collection and vetting, during the interministerial consultations, all relevant ministries and other stakeholders discuss existing practices and main gaps identified in the draft Migration Governance Profile. It is also an opportunity for them to comment and provide suggestions on the draft profile, in particular, when more recent programmes or laws have been adopted. This approach ensures that the most comprehensive information on different dimensions of migration governance are reflected in the final short profile.

Regarding the indicator framework, between each of the MGI rounds, the methodology was revised based on the lessons learned from the previous round(s) and feedback received from

all stakeholders, while always keeping questions as comparable as possible. This resulted mostly in minor language tweaks that did not affect comparability. Substantive changes to the MGI methodology happened at two points. First, in the initial MGI round with 15 countries, the framework only included questions on five of the six MiGOF dimensions: (a) adhering to international standards and fulfilment of migrants rights; (b) formulating policy using evidence and “whole-of-government” approach; (c) engaging with partners to address migration and related issues; (d) advancing the socioeconomic well-being of migrants and society; and (e) ensuring that migration takes place in a safe, orderly and dignified manner. Questions on the last dimension, titled “effectively addressing the mobility dimensions of crises”, were added one year later, and the responses were also used to update the profiles.

Second, several new questions were added in the third and fourth rounds of the MGI assessments. These were added to ensure a stronger gender perspective and a better alignment with language contained in relevant Sustainable Development Goals and related targets and indicators. It is indicated in the respective data analysis when data are only available for a limited amount of countries.

The fact that questions from the initial rounds were deleted for the subsequent rounds and new questions were introduced at a later round, and thus absent in the initial rounds, resulted in lower response rates for some questions.



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# MIGRATION GOVERNANCE INDICATORS

A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE



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